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Summary 
The first elections in Saudi Arabia took place in the spring of 2005. For the first time male 
citizens were allowed to elect half of the members of municipal councils. This was just one 
of numerous reforms in the autocratic kingdom. But do autocracy and reforms belong 
together? This report attempts to deal with the puzzle: first it will address the question of 
what “triggers” compelled the Saudi rulers to undertake these reforms, secondly, it will 
analyze if the reforms have stabilized or destabilized the regime, and thirdly, it will clarify 
if the reforms have led to a liberalization of autocratic structures, and if yes, to what 
extent. 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is an absolute monarchy. The state religion is Wahha-
bism, a puritan strand of Sunni Islam based on only early Sunna and the Qur’an itself. 
Saudi Arabia is considered to be particularly devout, the two most important holy sites in 
Islam, the Kaaba in Mecca and the tomb of Prophet Muhammad in Medina, are in Saudi 
Arabia. Religious scholars have considerable influence with the people. Professing other 
religions is illegal in Saudi Arabia, just as political parties or trade unions are. 
The royal al-Saud family has ruled the country since it was founded in 1932. The 
government consists of the Council of Ministers chaired by the King. Family members 
run key ministries such as interior, defense and foreign affairs. All laws in the country 
must be compatible with Shari’a Islamic law. Interpretation of its rules is very strict. For 
example, murderers, homosexuals, adulterers and blasphemers can be sentenced to death. 
There were 88 executions in 2005 alone. 
The monarchy is also the largest crude oil exporter, with its 264.2 billion barrels it 
controls about a quarter of the world’s oil reserves. The desert kingdom is a rentier and 
redistribution economy, in other words, a state whose oil export revenues provide it with 
a significant external rent which it can distribute at whim or in pursuit of political 
opportunities. Saudi Arabia can afford to forgo taxation of its citizens, thereby it offers no 
opportunity to argue for democracy on the principle of “no taxation without represen-
tation”. 
Four challenges can be identified as root causes of the reform process. Firstly, the 
attacks of September 11, 2001, as this event revealed ties between individual Saudi citizens 
and al-Qaeda. 15 of the 19 hijackers had Saudi passports. Until 1994 Osama bin Laden 
was a Saudi national. The Council on Foreign Relations asserted in a report in October 
2002 that Saudi Arabia had been the most important source of funds for al-Qaeda 
operations. The alliance with the USA was shaken to an unprecedented extent. The King-
dom’s closest ally openly criticized the autocratic regime. 
Secondly, internal political pressure mounted on the Royal Family. On the one hand, 
terrorist attacks became a concern for Saudi Arabia. For the first time in May 2003 and 
regularly thereafter al-Qaeda targeted the Kingdom. In the period between 2003 and 2005 
a total of 221 people lost their lives in terrorist acts. On the other hand, the population 
filed numerous petitions demanding enhanced participatory rights. In January 2003 the 
King received a petition for open elections to the Consultative Council and more civil 
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rights. Five other petitions followed. The final petition openly demanded a changeover 
from an absolute to a constitutional monarchy. 
Moreover, familiar old problems became even more explosive. The persistent popu-
lation growth and resulting high unemployment present significant challenges to the 
Saudi economy. Every year the Saudi Arabian labor market has to absorb 130,000 young 
men, however only 30,000 to 40,000 graduates find jobs. Sustaining the existing standards 
of living and welfare will require the investment of approximately 270 billion USD over 
the next twenty years. 
Likewise it became obvious that the aging of the leadership circle is dangerous for the 
stability of the country. Both King Abdullah and his Crown Prince Sultan are more than 
80 years old and the ruling family is having a heated debate about when to conduct a 
generational change in the royal house. If the family fails to decide on the transition 
between generations in the dynasty, in the worst case scenario it will have to select a new 
king from within its ranks every two or three years, with all the consequences this could 
entail for political continuity in the country. Thus the Saudi powers are confronted with 
criticism both from inside the country and from the outside. These combined pressures 
make them fear that their power could be jeopardized to an unprecedented extent. Accor-
dingly, they see a need for action. 
King Abdullah initiated a reform process. As part of the reforms, he established the 
Forum for National Dialogue, a panel for discussion of various reform proposals. So far six 
meetings for National Dialogue have been held. Discussion topics included extremism, 
rights and responsibilities of women, education, youth and perceptions of foreigners. At the 
climax of the National Dialogue in late 2003 the King announced elections to the Regional 
Parliament. The elections of half of the members in the Kingdom’s 178 municipal councils 
started on February 10, 2005 in Riyadh and proceeded in two subsequent phases. Obvious 
winners in the elections were Islamists. Within the family the monarch started to tackle the 
issue of generational change at the helm of the al-Sauds by establishing a new committee to 
select the next Crown Prince. 
In terms of foreign policy the ruling house has successfully improved relations with its 
American ally. It acquiesced to the US using the Prince Sultan base for the wars both in 
Afghanistan and in Iraq. The Royal Family even turned to its advantage the withdrawal of 
American troops in 2003, while it lost a stability factor it removed one of the main 
domestic criticisms against it. The new shift from democratization to containment of the 
Iranian power in American priorities in the Near and Middle East has finally secured the 
Kingdom’s return to the diplomatic arena. Riyadh is engaged and armed again as a 
partner. Washington appreciates the King’s negotiating talents. Saudi Arabia has been 
negotiating on all fronts: Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, and Palestine. 
The rulers are also addressing economic problems. Unemployment and poverty have 
been identified as key issues, with the intention being to deal with them through 
“Saudization” of the labor market. An education reform is to offer Saudi citizens training 
and skills required by the labor market. Beyond that, accession to the WTO in 2005 marks 
the first step towards building better conditions for foreign direct investment. 
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The objective of the reforms was to allow as little change as was required to meet the 
minimum demands both from within the country and from the outside. The partial 
elections to the Regional Parliament have satisfied at the lowest possible level the aspirations 
of both the petitioners and Washington for political participation of the citizenry. The royal 
house did not conduct a democratic reform of Saudi Arabia, rather it performed autocratic 
modernization. The potentates applied the reforms to secure the stability of the regime in 
Saudi Arabia. They neither weakened nor destabilized the Saudi state. On the contrary, as 
demonstrated by the severity of the reform “triggers”, the regime had been significantly 
weaker before the reforms than afterwards. 
Notwithstanding the strategic calculations of the royal house, the reforms were an 
enormous step forward for the people. Even these small reforms mean a major development 
for Saudi society, which has received virtually no rights since 1932. Therefore the people see 
that the reforms have led to a liberalization. 
Saudi Arabia’s policies since 2001 make one realize that the autocratic desert kingdom 
is capable of small steps towards change. These responses have demonstrated that the 
country could be induced to a slow transformation if external and internal pressures for 
reform were more destabilizing than the reforms themselves. 
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 1. Introduction 
The largest country on the Arabian Peninsula, the desert kingdom of Saudi Arabia is rich 
in oil but poor in water. It is one of the last absolute monarchies and the only nation to 
carry the name of the ruling Royal Family in its name. It is called after the founder of 
modern Saudi Arabia, Abdul al Aziz bin Saud (Ibn Saud), a capable Bedouin leader who 
unified the Bedouin clans on the Arabian Peninsula under his leadership in 1932 thanks 
to an alliance with a conservative Sunni religious scholar named Muhammad bin Adb-al-
Wahhab.1 
Despite numerous differences in values and world views, the USA has been the closest 
ally of Saudi Arabia for 60 years. This relationship fissured only after September 11, 2001. 
15 of the 19 hijackers had Saudi passports. Saudi Arabia was considered to be the 
spawning ground for terror. But Saudi Arabia was not spared from terror, for the first 
time in May 2003 and regularly thereafter the Kingdom came under terrorist attacks. At 
the same time the population filed multiple petitions demanding enhanced participatory 
rights. Instead of reprisals, the autocratic ruling house opted for political, economic and 
social reforms. These reforms led to a partial liberalization, climaxing in 2005 in the first 
local elections, accession to the World Trade Organization and a visit by Human Rights 
Watch. 
Reforms are very broadly defined as “changes in response to changes that have already 
occurred” (Krockow 1976: 11). There is essential consensus in scientific thinking about 
reforms in Arabic autocracies that autocratic rulers do not want to cede any power. Thus 
the objective of the autocratic rulers is to use reforms to demonstrate change to the public 
without surrendering even a single privilege of the potentates (Gvosdev 2004). In other 
words, the autocrats are ready to undertake only such reforms that are aimed at retaining 
power (Asseburg 2005: 280). However, the commonalities do not extend beyond the 
objectives because the decision to pursue reforms in an autocracy is assessed very dif-
ferently as a result of unpredictable consequences. The scientific community is divided 
over the issue of whether reforms bring stability to an autocratic regime, or destabilize it 
even more. 
Some discourage autocratic rulers from reforms because they could “weaken, or even 
de-stabilize countries” (Kapiszewski 2006: 478). Reforms are even viewed as a potential 
suicide for an autocracy. “Full autocracies are trapped by an either-me-or-you logic, that 
makes reform seem like suicide” (Brumberg 2005: 17).  
On the other hand, Samuel Huntington believes that both reforms and repression are 
necessary to distract from the citizenry’s lacking political participation. “Both reform and 
repression are aspects of the centralization of power and the failure to expand political 
 
 
1 His interpretation of the Muslim creed (Wahhabism) was driven by the conviction that faith may be based 
only on the early Sunna, i.e. the actions and statements of the Prophet, and the Qur’an itself. He 
categorically rejected all subsequent developments (Clauss 1998: 46). 
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participation” (Huntigton 1968: 191). Moreover, to achieve the long-term stability badly 
needed by autocracies, the Arabic governments use political reforms “to secure regime 
stability” (Asseburg 2005: 280). It is a matter of survival for an autocracy to stabilize its 
regime, because “only those systems that do not enjoy sufficient stability come under 
pressure to transform” (Sandschneider 1995: 111). But it is not just the autocratic rulers 
who fear transformation. A study by the US Administration-sponsored State Failure Task 
Force (2000) found that the odds of becoming a “failed state” were seven times as high for 
the states in transition from autocracy to democracy than they were for stable autocracies. 
The transformation process is also dangerous for global peace, as Edward Mansfield and 
Jack Snyder point out: “Democratizing states were more likely to fight wars than were 
states that had undergone no change in regime” (Mansfield/Snyder 1995: 81). On the 
basis of these findings, they conclude that “promoting democracy may not promote 
peace” (Mansfield/Snyder 1995: 94, Mansfield/Snyder 2005).  
Specifically with respect to the Saudi Arabian autocracy experts support the thesis “that 
democratization may not immediately produce more peaceful and stable regimes” (Kapis-
zewski 2006: 478). Even Thomas Carothers came to the following conclusion: “In some 
countries staying with an existing autocratic regime is a better alternative” (Carothers 2007: 
13). In those states where the rule of “go fully democratic, or don’t go at all” (Mansfield/ 
Synder 1995: 95) is not feasible, democratization could put both peace and stability in 
danger. The danger of destabilization may explain in terms of science why there has been 
neither widespread democratization, nor consolidation of democratic systems in any of the 
Arab countries until now (Asseburg 2005: 290). In any case, the jury is still out on whether 
the reforms in Saudi Arabia have resulted in a liberalization (i.e. opening of non-democratic 
regimes and expansion of rights), as one would expect after the first phase of the demo-
cratization model2 propounded by O’Donnell und Schmitter (1986). 
This poses three questions with respect to Saudi Arabia: first, what were the triggers 
that forced the royal house to undertake political, economic and social reforms? Second, 
have the al-Sauds succeeded in retaining their power and sustaining the stability of the 
regime through the reforms, or do the reforms indicate destabilization and a weakening 
of the Kingdom? Third, have the reforms resulted in liberalization of autocratic 
structures, and if yes, to what extent? However, first there will be a brief review of political 
and economic structures of the Kingdom. 
 
 
2 This prototypic model assumes a rift in the leadership of the authoritarian regime between hardliners and 
softliners for a transition to commence: the latter will initiate the liberalization process. The self-organizing 
society will claim the new rights (“resurrection of civil society”), and insist on both a further liberalization 
and on democratization (Waldrauch 1996: 11). 
Autocratic Modernization in Saudi Arabia 3
 
 
2. Saudi Arabia: An Opaque Land of Contradictions 
Saudi Arabia is home to 23 million people, according to the latest democracy index they 
live in an autocratic country almost completely devoid of political freedoms. Freedom 
House describes the political environment in Saudi Arabia as “not free” (Freedom House 
2007).3 The Polity IV Country Report gave Saudi Arabia an average score of minus 10, the 
worst result in terms of regime and authority measurements (Marshall/Jaggers 2005). The 
Bertelsmann-Transformation-Index (BTI) does not feature any good scores for Saudi 
Arabia on its Status Index (Democracy) and Management Index (Market Economy). 
Saudi Arabia ranks 93 on the Status Index and 90 on the Management Index out of 119 
countries in the study, landing in the bottom one-third (Bertelsmann Transformation 
Index 2006).4 Though the indices may faithfully represent existing trends, the Saudi 
system is somewhat more sophisticated than the indices reflect. 
2.1 Islam and Politics 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was officially founded on September 23, 1932. The political 
system of the Kingdom is based on the Muslim system of governance established by 
Prophet Muhammad 1,300 years earlier. Since the establishment of statehood the Qur’an 
has served as an unofficial basic law of the Kingdom (Sirhal 1990: 312). King Fahd officially 
declared both the Qur’an and the Sunna to be the constitution of the country in 1992. 
On behalf of the spiritual community (ulama), the supreme mufti and the council of 
senior islamic scholars (hai’at kibar al-ulama), along with a dedicated police force are 
responsible for overseeing compliance with Islamic laws (Koszinowski 2002: 3). The 
“religious police” units operate in parallel to regular police and monitor to what extent the 
Saudis observe the tough behavioral restrictions of Wahhabist scholars in their public life 
(Koszinowski 2001). In this respect Saudi Arabia is the only country along with Oman 
where the Qur’an has replaced the constitution and Islam dominates all spheres of life 
including politics. The parliament, trade unions, freedom of speech, free press and 
political parties are rejected as un-Islamic. The ban on parties also precludes all legitimate 
opposition. In fact, every citizen owes the ruler his absolute loyalty and obedience. 
The strong role of religion in politics traces its roots back to the alliance established 
250 years ago between the successors of imam Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab and the 
Saud family. Therefore it is no surprise that the political and social structure of Saudi 
Arabia is shaped by the strong interdependence between the royal family and the clergy. 
The supreme clerical authority in the country rests with the Council of Senior Islamic 
Scholars. It was established in 1971 after the death of the grand mufti Muhammad b. 
 
 
3 In 2007 Freedom House gave Saudi Arabia the following scores: 7 (political rights) and 6 (civil liberties) 
(the best score is 1 out of 7).  
4 Among others, the following are considered to be criteria for political transformation: statehood, political 
participation, rule of law and institutional stability. 
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Ibrahim Al ash-Shaikh (1969) to control all religious affairs in the broadest sense of the 
word in the country. Its 17 members issue legal opinions in their individual and collective 
capacities. In precarious situations the Council issues opinions to provide legitimacy to 
important government decisions. Important religious-political offices in the country are 
occupied exclusively by Wahhabists (Steinberg 2003: 15).  
The Wahhabist scholars act as a political and ideological pillar of the regime because 
only Islam can assert and define the identity of the regime and its idiosyncratic form of 
statehood (Hertog 2002: 1224). Even though they are not in a position to exert direct 
influence over political decision-making, they do have a significant political function. Even 
today the Wahhabist scholars remain important actors in Saudi Arabian internal politics. 
They act as advisors to the King and the royal house where they enjoy privileged access, they 
control large segments of the education system and influence curricula in the segments 
outside of their control, television and radio content is also subject to their oversight, and 
they appoint judges to all regular courts (Steinberg 2002: 16). Until now the ruling family 
has not acted against the powerful position of the scholars because they have a strong 
influence on the population. Support from the clergy remains an important source of 
legitimacy for the Saud family. Because “the larger the social and spatial gap between the 
ruling family and the people grew, the more the scholars assumed the role of the 
intermediary between the two” (Steinberg 2002: 632). To demonstrate religious legitimacy 
one of the King’s official titles is “protector of the holy sites” (Mecca and Medina).  
2.2 The al-Sauds 
Along with the Islamic scholars the king determines the fate of the country. The monarch 
embodies both the legislative and the executive branches. The second level of the power 
pyramid is occupied by the ruler’s family. Even 75 years later, the family of the state founder 
Ibn Saud remains the most powerful and the largest family in the country and it continues 
to grow. The exact number of people in the ruler’s family is not clear. Various estimates 
indicate tens of thousands of princes, however it is more likely that the number is 
somewhere between 5,000 and 8,000 (Steinberg 2003: 9). Not all members of the family 
have the same influence over the politics of the country. A small informal group of princes 
probably numbering about a dozen people makes the most important decisions. It consists 
of the king, his crown prince and the princes who control the key agencies of the 
government (Steinberg 2003: 9). Along with King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz (*1923)5 the 
core leadership of the family comprises the Crown Prince and minister of defense Sultan 
bin Abdul Aziz (*1924), minister of interior Nayef bin Abdul Aziz (*1933) and minister for 
foreign affairs Saud bin Faisal (*1942). The two former Saudi ambassadors to Washington, 
Bandar bin Faisal (*1949) and Turki bin Faisal (*1945), also belong to the inner circle of 
power. The last meeting of the al-Saud family’s potentates took place when Abdullah 
convened the first official meeting of the royal Saudi family council on June 4, 2000 (Majlis 
 
 
5 Abdullah has been King of Saudi Arabia since August 2005. But he took control of government operations 
back in 1995 when King Fahd suffered a stroke. 
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al-A'ila as-Sa'udiya al-Malika). Abdullah was the chairman, his half-brother Sultan was 
appointed deputy. The council consists of 19 members, however among other people 
Minister of Interior Nayef is not included, even though he is considered to be influential. 
The official position is that this institution deals only with purely internal family affairs. 
Political issues are ostensibly outside of its purview. In any case, it manifests a clear trend 
towards formalization of decision-making processes inside the family (Steinberg 2003: 9). 
The Royal Family also dominates the Council of Ministers established by Ibn Saud in 
1953. It meets every Monday bringing together the King, the Crown Prince, the Vice-
Crown Prince (deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers) and all ministers. The 
members are appointed and, if necessary, removed by the King. All key offices (interior, 
foreign affairs and defense) are taken by princes from the royal house, however more and 
more agencies are given not only to members of the dynasty but also to highly qualified 
experts (Abou-Taam/Khalatbari 2006: 122). 
2.3 The Consultative Council 
Another advisory assembly is the Consultative Council established by King Fahd in 
December 1993. By founding the Consultative Council the King responded to the growing 
resentment in the early 1990s at the stationing of US troops in Saudi Arabia. As a result of 
public criticism6 the royal house was forced to accommodate the request for an advisory 
assembly. The 60 person7 assembly was constituted through a meeting on December 29, 
1993. This way the King satisfied a significant demand. Admittedly the public was upset that 
the members were not elected but appointed by the King and the assembly had no legis-
lative powers. Moreover, a number of clans were left underrepresented in the assembly – a 
very sensitive issue for a country organized by tribal affiliation8 where tribal loyalties and 
solidarity within patriarchal family unions remain fixtures of the society. Over time 
recruitment into the Consultative Council was extended to cover the whole Kingdom. 
Printed media and television feature extensive coverage of the Council’s meetings. Normally 
they take place once a year in a magnificent hall in Riyadh’s palace district, with sessions 
stretching for many weeks, and the King conducting an opening ceremony (Seznec 2002: 
38). 
 
 
6 The accumulated dissatisfaction took various forms. In November 1990 more than 40 women sat behind 
steering wheels to protest against the ban on driving. In April 1991 businessmen, intellectuals and 
journalists published an open letter to the King in an Egyptian newspaper, demanding the convocation of 
an advisory assembly along with political liberalization and freedom of opinion (Koszinowaski 2002: 7). 
In 1991 advocates of reforms wrote a 12 point petition to the King, followed by a 44 page program of 
reforms in 1992. 
7 Since July 5, 1997 the Consultative Council consisted of 90 members (150 members since 2005), with the 
King appointing a new lineup every four years (Abou-Taam/Khalatbari 2006: 123). 
8 The tribes in Saudi Arabia can be roughly divided into three large groups. Firstly, the clans of Najd from 
whom the royal family is descended and who still largely cling to Bedouin traditions and should be classed as 
conservative. Secondly, the clans of Hedjas, who are predominantly urban. They are subjected to various 
Western influences and more liberal than the Najd Arabs. Thirdly, the clans of the Hasa Province who are a 
reactionary religious minority considered to be heretics by the Wahhabis (Brandes 1999: 263). 
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The Consultative Council primarily adopts resolutions and recommendations for the 
government’s work (Ehteshami 2003: 69). Notwithstanding the fact that it is the King who 
appoints them, the members take their mandate for consultation, review and criticism 
very seriously. Thus the Council Speaker enjoys great respect both within and outside of 
the Council (Ehteshami 2003: 69).  
The founding of the Consultative Council should not be viewed as an import of Western 
democracy. The Qur’an refers to the Islamic principle of Shura. It stands for advice and 
consultation between Muslims. This is the origin of the notion of consultative councils, 
which have assumed a somewhat parliamentarian function in many Muslim societies. 
However, it is in no way a fundamental structure of democracy, because Shura is solely a 
consultative, and not a legislative institution (Abou-Taam/Khalatbari 2006: 123).  
Figure 1: The Saudi Arabian political system 
Source: Author’s drawing 
2.4 Opposition 
In stark contrast to Western legislatures parliamentary opposition of any kind is absent. 
Hence Saudi Arabian opposition is always extraparliamentary, if not in exile. Arguably 
the most famous member of the Saudi Arabian opposition is Osama bin Laden. In his 
statements he has been demanding the liberation of the Arabian Peninsula from the Saud 
family. In 1994 his attacks on the Saudi regime became so fierce that Riyadh revoked his 
Saudi citizenship. Bin Laden published a ten page open letter to King Fahd on August 3, 
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1995, accusing the Saudi monarch of failing to abide by the teachings of Abdul Wahhab 
(Fandy 1999: 186).9 
Furthermore, Saudi Arabia has three other opposition movements. Firstly, the liberals, 
primarily young people with Western education and former Arab nationalists and 
communists aspiring to modernize the country in a Western fashion. One of them is 
Turki Al-Hamad, a writer who has continuously criticized Wahhabism in general, and the 
religious police in particular (Lacroix 2005a). Secondly, there are the Islamists, who 
constitute the largest group by far (Gause 2002: 48). The Islamist opposition in Saudi 
Arabia is in turn divided into three groups. 
 – Firstly, the liberal Islamists or “Islamo-liberals” (Lacroix 2004). The liberal Islamists 
make a number of common demands such as constitutionalization of the Saudi 
monarchy, creation of a directly elected parliament, termination of discrimination 
against minorities, and improved redistribution of wealth – all under the Islamic law 
of Sharia, in great contrast to the liberals. The Islamo-liberals include both Sunnis and 
Shi’ites (Lacroix 2005b).  
 – Secondly, the conservative Islamists. Their key demand is stricter adherence to Islamic 
laws. They express concerns about the disregard for Islamic values, they rebuke the tele-
vision for pervasive shows with unveiled women and criticize the press for publishing 
articles marked by intellectual perversions. Moreover, in less specific terms, they insist 
on the “Islamization” of foreign policy (Koszinowski 2002: 7). The difference between 
them and the Islamo-liberals is that they do not demand elections, and their views on 
women and minorities are clearly more conservative than those of the liberal Islamists. 
 – Thirdly, the Salafi Jihadists (Lacroix 2005b), the most violent and radical group, who 
focus on foreign policy and advocate the rejection of Western influences (King 1998: 
10). Their favorite topics include denunciation of American presence in “the country 
of the two holy sites” and support for the Taliban, whose government and political 
decisions they attempt to legitimize. Multiple books and public declarations with 
characteristic titles like “About the the lack of faith of those who assist Americans” are 
published on the websites of their sympathizers (Lacroix 2005b). The Saudi govern-
ment considers the Salafi Jihadists to be the spiritual instigators of the terrorist attacks 
in Saudi Arabia (Lacroix 2005).  
The third opposition movement consists of the London-based exiles. Both liberals and 
liberal Islamists sent numerous political petitions to the royal house between 1990 and 
1992. The catalogs of their respective demands feature certain commonalities: both 
 
 
9 The two parties have not always been such bitter enemies. In 1984 Prince Turki al-Faisal engaged bin Laden 
to lead an “Arab-Afghan” recruitment office to support the Mujaheddin in their struggle against the USSR. 
The office was a forerunner of the al-Qaeda organization founded in 1989. Moreover, Prince Turki allegedly 
helped bin Laden flee from Saudi Arabia in 1991 and personally declined to accept Sudan’s extradition of bin 
Laden in 1996 (Gold 2003: 181). Sources in the US intelligence community believe that many princes paid 
protection money to bin Laden. Additionally, Saudi money went to the Al-Wafa Humanitarian Organization 
and Muwafaq Foundation, both believed to have served as fronts for al-Qaeda, funding its operations (Levitt 
2002). 
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groups insisted on combating corruption and nepotism, reducing arbitrariness of the 
judiciary and, in no specific terms, opening the political system (Hertog 2002: 1222). 
For the first time an opposition group officially assembled itself in Riyadh on May 3, 
1993, calling itself “Committee for the Defence of Legitimate Rights” (CDLR) (Koszinowski 
2002: 8). The founders of the Committee, Muhammad al-Masari (a physics professor) and 
Sad al-Faqih (a physician), belonged to the group that had produced both the above 
mentioned petitions to King Fahd. The Committee was banned on May 11, 1993, many 
members and sympathizers were arrested. Al-Masari and al-Faqih fled to London in 
1993/94 (Koszinowski 2002: 10). Since then they have been sending fax and email messages 
from exile in London trying to mobilize the Saudi Arabian population against the rule of the 
Saud family. The two leaders had a falling out in 1996, and Faqih immediately went on to 
build the “Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia” (MIRA), whose objective, strategy and 
ideology showed no significant differences to those of the CDLR. Activities of the Saudi 
Arabian opposition in exile, whether CDLR or MIRA, have so far failed to make any 
discernible impact on developments in Saudi Arabia (Koszinowski 2002: 13).  
Along with their participation in the Islamo-liberal opposition, there is another reason 
why the Saudi Shi’ites are a menace to the Royal Family. It is true that the Shi’ites 
constitute only some ten percent of the Saudi Arabian population. However, they make 
up almost 50 percent of the population in the strategically and economically important 
Eastern Province where all the Saudi oil is produced. Their strong cultural kinship with 
Shi’a Iran and even stronger ties to their religious brothers in Iraq are a cause of frequent 
concern for the Saudi leadership (Steinberg 2001: 27). 
The opposition is divided and there are no real alternatives to the al-Saud system. Its 
fragmentation into various groups and unorganized individuals makes it almost irrele-
vant. There is no threat of an Iranian-style revolution because opposition groups cannot 
coalesce (Satloff 1998: 59). 
2.5 Oil and Rentier Structure 
The most significant factor of stability in the country, however, is neither the Royal 
Family, nor its alliance with the Wahhabi clergy, but its economic base. Saudi Arabia is 
the largest petroleum exporter in the world, with its 264.2 billion barrels of crude oil it 
controls over a quarter of global reserves and enjoys the lowest production costs per 
barrel (1-2 USD). The advantageous “finding costs” of approximately 10 US cents per 
barrel explain the low production costs (Energy Intelligence Group 1999: 7). The 
Kingdom has 80 oil and gas fields and over 1000 production sites. More than half of its 
reserves are concentrated in just 8 fields, including the two largest oil fields at Ghawar (70 
billion barrels) and Safaniya (19 billion barrels). These enormous reserves give Saudi 
Arabia the power to dictate the oil price. It is the only country so far that can act as the 
“swing supplier”. The Saudis can increase their capacity from 8 to 10.5 million barrels per 
day in three months to compensate for global losses in production, alternatively they can 
drive oil prices sky-high (Kleveman 2003). 
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Profits from oil exports allow the ruling family to sustain the Saudi Arabian regime. 
The regime does not depend on tax revenues so it does not have to negotiate the 
fundamentals of taxation with its citizens and grant them rights to political participation 
in return. The desert kingdom is a rentier and redistribution state par excellence, a state 
whose oil export revenues provide it with a significant external rent which it can 
distribute at whim or in pursuit of political opportunities (Perthes 2002a: 290). Thus the 
state subsidizes its subjects10 and pays them off not to pursue demands for political 
participation (Glosemeyer/Perthes 2003: 4). The rentier state offers no opportunity to 
argue for democracy on the principle of “no taxation without representation”. 
However it is doubtful that Saudi Arabia can afford to pay off its citizens indefinitely 
to quench their thirst for participation. At least by 1998 it became clear that the era of 
affluence was over. That year the economic mismanagement by the house of Saud since 
the early 1990s became evident. With expenses to the tune of roughly 60 billion USD the 
second Gulf War far exceeded the financial capacity of Saudi Arabia. The budget deficit 
grew to 37 billion USD in 1990/91 and by another 10 billion USD in 1992 (Cordesman 
1999: 9).  
Declining oil prices in 1998 undermined attempts to reform the state.11 Oil revenues 
sank from 45.5 billion USD in 1997 to 29.4 billion USD in 1998, resulting in a 35% 
reduction (Cordesman 1999: 11). The decline negatively impacted the whole Saudi 
Arabian economy. 90 % of export revenues and 75% of budget revenues come from the 
oil industry (Taecker 1998: 4). Radical austerity measures were introduced in social 
services and infrastructural investment. Since then Abdullah made it absolutely clear that 
the era of affluence was over and the citizens of Saudi Arabia must recognize that the oil 
wealth would not last forever (Perthes 2002a: 305). 
2.6 Alliance with the USA 
One of the most important external pillars and at the same time one of the biggest 
problems in domestic politics is Saudi Arabia’s relationship with the USA. The Kingdom’s 
Wahhabi ideology does not offer much of a foundation for cooperation with the Christian 
nation and close ally of Israel. However, a closer look reveals that the interdependence of 
the unequal “friends” should not be dismissed. 
The foundation for the friendship was laid when Ibn Saud and President Roosevelt12 met 
in February 1945 in Egypt aboard heavy cruiser USS Quincy. Roosevelt made it clear that 
the US considered Ibn Saud to be the leading Arabic head of state and assured that it would 
 
 
10 Saudi Arabia offers its citizens exemption from taxation, free medical care, childcare and education, along 
with subsidized housing. Moreover, until 1985 Riyadh employed a large part of the population in the 
public service. However, the oil rent is not used for any strategy to combat poverty (Steinberg 2004b: 132).  
11 The combined effects of the crisis in Asia, reduced demand in industrial nations due to large crude and 
fuel stocks and resumed oil production in Iraq drove the oil prices below 10 USD per barrel. 
12 Already in February 1943 Franklin D. Roosevelt wrote to his Secretary of State “that the defense of Saudi 
Arabia is vital to the defense of the United States” (Stork 1980: 24). 
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protect Saudi Arabian territorial integrity. In return for financial assistance Saudi Arabia 
had already granted oil concessions to American companies and approved the deployment 
of US troops at the military airport in Dhahran in December 1943. Then came years of joint 
struggle against communism and Nasserism. Bilateral relations hit a low point in 1973 with 
the Saudi oil embargo in response to the US policy towards Israel. But they conclusively 
reconciled their differences when Fahd, who was the Crown Prince at the time, signed a 
Special Relationship Agreement in March 1975. Underlying the accord was the willingness 
of the Saudis to invest their oil profits in American enterprises13 and guarantee moderate oil 
prices by keeping flexible their crude production within OPEC. In exchange Washington 
promised Riyadh that it would protect the Kingdom’s security and provide technical 
assistance for industrial development (Twinam 1994: 35). 
American interests remained constant over the years. “The US depends on Saudi Arabia 
to provide oil exports, use its swing production capacity to help stabilize the oil market, and 
provide basing and military support for US power projection in the Gulf” (Cordesman 
2002: 73). The US energy policy is tied to Saudi Arabia simply because of the Kingdom’s 
tremendous oil reserves. Saudi Arabia has been one of the largest oil suppliers to the US 
since the beginning of the partnership, and therefore plays a vital role (National Energy 
Policy Development Group 2001). But the US needs not just the Saudi oil but also the 
assurance that Saudi Arabia as a trade partner will continue to invest in the American 
economy. 
Since the end of World War II the USA has acted as protector for Saudi Arabia. It has 
used its military presence as a beachhead in the unstable region, while the Saud dynasty 
needed the US troops to maintain the stability of its regime. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 
brought it home to the ruling family that the regime was not in a position to defend itself 
without American protection despite large purchases of weapons in the 1980s. Arms sales 
from the US and joint exercises were and are indispensable for the Saudi Arabian armed 
forces. Accordingly, the two governments pursue intensive military cooperation even 
though it is not codified in any agreement (Perthes 2002b: 6).  
A characteristic of this “friendship” is the silence around it. Both countries recognize 
their insurmountable differences and prefer not to emphasize them because the strategic 
co-dependance is too great. Not until September 11, 2001 did this well protected, “oil for 
security” alliance suffer a severe blow. 
3. Triggers of the Reform Process 
To provide a comprehensive explanation of the Saudi reform process one would need to 
illuminate its “triggers”. One should view foreign and domestic political issues along with 
related criticism of the royal house directly in the context of the resulting reform process. 
 
 
13 Saudi investments in the US amount to approximately 600 billion USD (Fürtig 2005b).  
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The Saudi reform process should not be seen as a consequence of a single event, on the 
contrary, it was triggered by a combination of incidents and problems. Four events or 
challenges can be identified as root causes of the reform process. 
Firstly, September 11 and subsequent criticism from Washington with respect to the 
contacts between the Saudis and terrorist groups became a foreign policy issue. Secondly, 
terrorist attacks inside the Kingdom, on the one hand, and growing participatory aspi-
rations of the public, on the other hand, increased domestic political pressure. Moreover, 
familiar old problems became even more explosive. The persistent population growth and 
resulting high unemployment, as well as the aging of the leadership circle pose obvious 
dangers to the stability of the country. 
3.1 External Pressure: The USA and September 11, 2001 
The attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon confronted Saudi Arabia with hard 
facts: 15 of the 19 hijackers had Saudi passports, and the instigator of terror, Osama bin 
Laden, had been a Saudi national until 1994. Apart from that, Saudi Arabian citizens 
allegedly provided money to finance not only these attacks, but also many other al-Qaeda 
operations (Prados 2003: 2).  
The Kingdom repeatedly tried to downplay the participation of Saudi citizens in the 
events of September 11.14 Nevertheless, the Saudi leadership was alarmed by the obvious 
sympathy certain parts of its population felt for Osama bin Laden, who was after all an 
enemy of the royal house (Perthes 2002c: 10). Particularly the pro-American Sudairi 
Seven15 are a thorn in Osama bin Laden’s flesh (bin Laden 1996). 
These domestic sympathies may also explain the large proportion of Saudi citizens in 
terrorist organizations. 100 out of the 158 alleged al-Qaeda terrorists detained in Guanta-
namo Bay in January 2002 had Saudi Arabian passports (Bandow 2002: 4). In 2004 it was 
160 out of 640 detainees (Amnesty International Deutschland 2004). Saudi nationals were 
also involved in the attacks on the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and in 
the bombing of the USS Cole in the port of Aden (Yemen) in 2000 (Miller/Stone/Mitchell 
2002: 271). The Council on Foreign Relations’ Independent Task Force asserted in a 
report in October 2002 that Saudi Arabia had been the most important source of funds 
for al-Qaeda operations (Prados 2003: 2). The 27 blacked-out pages of the Congressional 
9/11 Report allegedly describe the Saudi government’s contacts with al-Qaeda (Meyer 
2003).  
 
 
14 For example, the Foreign Minister Saud: “The problem is that Osama bin Laden was a Saudi citizen. He 
used 15 Saudis for September 11. That’s why critics say Saudi Arabia must be somehow involved in bin 
Laden’s schemes” (Interview with Prince Saud, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Saudi Arabia, in Welt am 
Sonntag, 12.1.2003, 6). 
15 King Fahd and his six full brothers constitute a very powerful unit in the family named after their mother 
Hussa bin Ahmad Al Sudairi, the favorite wife of the state founder’s and a descendant of the noble Arab 
clan of Sudairi. The group includes King Fahd, Sultan, Nayef, Salman, Deputy Minister of Defense Prince 
Abd al-Rahman, businessman Prince Turki and Deputy Minister of Interior Prince Ahmed. 
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Consequently, 600 relatives of victims of the attacks in New York and Washington filed 
suits against Saudi Arabian banks, ostensible relief organizations and individual members of 
the Saud family (Schmidt 2002), demanding billions in compensatory damages. 
Involvement of Saudis in an attack on the US caused a backlash, particularly in 
America. The US mass media responded in outrage and highlighted the controversial 
alliance and its dangers for the security of the American people. A policy paper leaked to 
the Washington Post from the Pentagon of all the places characterized the Kingdom as 
“the kernel of evil, the prime mover, the most dangerous opponent of the United States” 
and as a terror superpower par excellence (Hertog 2002: 1217). 
On top of that, the partner’s reliability in the war on terror leaves a lot to be desired as 
far as America is concerned. Saudi Arabia refused to immediately freeze accounts of 
terrorism suspects and delivered only limited information about the origins of the 
hijackers (Follath/Windfuhr/Zand 2002: 134). 
In its Patterns of Global Terrorism Report the State Department criticized the Saudi 
Arabian leadership for failure to agree to the public disclosure of charity finances (Prados 
2003: 2). On the other hand, it repeatedly praised Saudi Arabia for its support in the war on 
terror. The US Department of State spokesman Richard Boucher announced on November 
25, 2002 that the Administration “made it clear again and again we believe the Saudi 
response on matters involving the war on terrorism has been very strong” (Prados 2003: 2). 
The US politics in the region was watched in Saudi Arabia very closely. Admittedly, 
Riyadh was never directly in the focus of the US policy for promoting democracy, but the 
criticism of Iran and Iraq pertained to the desert kingdom just as much. Bush clearly 
criticized the lack of freedom: “All people have a right to choose their own government and 
determine their own destiny, and the United States support their aspirations to live in 
freedom” (Bush 2003) and underscored that brutal dictatorships “with ties to terrorism, 
with great wealth, will not be permitted to dominate a vital region” (Bush 2003). 
Even though the US Administration refrained from direct critical statements because 
of dependance on Saudi oil exports and arms imports, the ranks of advisors publicly and 
unambiguously spoke out against the Royal Family. In his speech in April 2003 the 
former CIA director James Woolsey said: “We want you nervous. We want you to realize 
that [...] we are on the side of those whom you, [...] the Saudi royal family, most fear. We 
are on the side of your own people” (Alterman 2003: 158). 
Critical voices in the US Congress became louder too. The linkages between the 
Kingdom and fundamentalist groups came to the fore. Senator Ernest Hollings from 
South Carolina put it in no uncertain terms: “We have problems: The Saudi Arabian and 
other Muslim support of terrorists“ (Congressional Record 2002: S10348). Many believe 
that the lack of a process towards democracy explains the closeness between the royal 
house and terrorist groups: “The lack of democracy in Saudi Arabia [...] seems to have 
created fertile ground for the development of terrorist movements in these countries” 
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(Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia of the Committee 
on International Relations 2001: 2).16  
The criticism of Saudi Arabia did not shy away from legislative bills. A law was 
proposed in the US House of Representatives in July 2003 that would have listed Saudi 
Arabia as a state sponsor of terrorism. It was rejected by 231 votes against 191. The Saudi 
Arabia Accountability Act was introduced in the US Senate in November 2003. It urged 
Riyadh to make a maximum effort to combat terrorism. But the bill failed to advance “as 
the State Department declared that Saudi Arabia had taken actions to disrupt domestic al-
Qaeda cells and improved anti-terrorist cooperation with the USA” (Kapiszewski 2006: 
464). But behind the scenes the Saudis were criticized for a lack of effective commitment 
to the war on terror: “We have not gotten all that we want from the Saudis during the first 
phase of the war against terrorism” (Gause 2002: 47).  
The 60 year old alliance appeared to be at a crossroads. Though the Saudi leadership 
remained mute to the criticism from Washington, Riyadh soon realized that even the 
good relations with the US Administration could no longer protect the Kingdom from 
hostility. Saudi Arabia had to reconsider its response to the terrorist attacks on its ally. 
3.2 Internal Threats: Terror and Petitions 
For a long time the royal house turned a blind eye to the danger of extremism in its own 
country and denied any responsibility for its acts of violence. But this stance had to 
change in the spring of 2003. Twelve suicide bombers blew themselves up on May 12 in 
three high-security foreign compounds, 34 people, primarily employees of the Vinell 
Corporation, an American weapons manufacturer, died and 200 more were wounded. On 
November 9, 2003 two truck bombs exploded in Riyadh, killing 17 and injuring 122 
people (MacFarquahar 2003: 1). On April 21, 2004 a car bomb devastated security forces 
headquarters in Riyadh, 4 people were killed and 148 wounded (Nüsse 2004: 1). On May 
1, 2004 two Americans, two Britons and one Australian were murdered in the port town 
of Janbu (Follath 2004: 120). In late May 2004 an attack on a foreign compound in Al-
Khobar city in Eastern Saudi Arabia resulted in 22 deaths, in June Irishman Simon 
Cumbers, a BBC cameraman, was killed and his colleague, correspondent Frank Gardner, 
seriously injured in a gun attack. In the same month an American employee of Lockheed 
Martin, Paul M. Johnson, was beheaded (Zuhur 2005: 36), in December 2004 there was a 
raid against the US consulate in Jidda, 5 Saudis were injured. The attacks were alternately 
committed by a self-proclaimed al-Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula group (Tanzim al-
Qaida fi Jazirat al-Arab) and the “Brigades of the Two Holy Mosques” (Kata eb al-
 
 
16 Though Congressional statements were clear, Washington took practically no action to promote 
democracy. The US supported reforms primarily through the Embassy in Saudi Arabia and the State 
Department Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI). In 2003 the Embassy arranged country visits for 
human rights organizations and the Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. The 
same year the Embassy also organized “orientation tours” to the US and workshops for journalists, 
educators and officials (Sharp 2004: 6).  
14 Iris Wurm 
 
 
Haramain) (Lacroix 2005b). A total of 221 people lost their lives in terrorist attacks be-
tween 2003 and 2005 (Teitelbaum 2005: 1).  
After May 12, 2003 which the Saudis see as “their September 11”, the government 
stopped pointing fingers at other countries when terrorism was mentioned (Thumann 
2003). This is how the 9/11 Commission Report describes the Saudi conversion: “[a]s in 
Pakistan, Yemen, and other countries, [Saudi] attitudes changed when the terrorism came 
home“ (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States 2004: 373). 
Even though the security situation has stabilized since 2005, the terrorist attacks clearly 
demonstrated that the regime had long underestimated the scale and intensity of the 
threat from terrorist groups. 
But terror was not to be the only problem for the Kingdom, another challenge came 
from citizens demanding enhanced participation. On January 20, 2003 Abdullah, the 
Crown Prince at the time, received a petition signed by 104 progressively-minded 
intellectuals and liberal Islamists (“A Vision for the Present and the Future of the 
Nation”). The petition was drafted by Abdullah al-Hamed (a liberal Islamist from 
Riyadh), Mohamed Said Tayyeb (a liberal lawyer from Jeddah) and Jaafar al-Shayeb, a 
Shi’ite (Kapiszewski 2006: 464). Among other things, they demanded elections to the 
Consultative Council and Regional Assemblies, separation of powers, a judiciary reform, 
guaranteed civil and human rights, as well as more rights for women. They aspired to give 
the Consultative Council power to legislate and means of control (Kapiszewski 2006: 464). 
Surprisingly, Abdullah did not respond in the same way King Fahd had done to the well-
known previous petitions after the second Gulf War (Fürtig 2005a: 274). That same 
month he received 36 of the signatories and assured them that “your demands are my 
demands”. He promised the group that “reforms [were] only a matter of time” (Raphaeli 
2005: 522). Minister of Interior Nayef was clearly more negative about these reform 
aspirations. His motto is “no to change, yes to development” (Jones 2003). He believes 
that no change is necessary in Saudi Arabia: “Change means changing something that 
already exists. Whatever exists in the Kingdom is already well-established; however, there 
is a scope for development – development that does not clash with the principles of the 
nation” (Jones 2003). 
But Abdullah would not be misled by such critical statements and pursued further 
contacts with advocates of reforms. On April 30, 2003 450 Saudi Shi’ites signed a petition 
(“Partners in One Nation”) demanding equality of citizens and an end to discrimination 
(Gause 2004: 23). They joined the January petition but also asked for a public declaration 
by the King securing more respect for the Shi’a rights and equal treatment with other 
residents (Kapiszewski 2006: 464f). Once again Abdullah showed readiness to talk. He 
received the Shi’a delegation and discussed the essence of the demands with them. At least 
officially this turned the Shi’ites from suspicious and discriminated apostates into (mildly) 
tolerated interlocutors. Minister of Defense Sultan also sought dialog. In July 2003 he 
invited 30 intellectuals and asked them for specific political reform proposals (Fürtig 
2005a: 275).  
With the exception of these meetings the appeals of the reformists went unheeded. 
This led to new petitions. On September 24 more than 300 Saudis including 50 women 
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signed a petition entitled “In Defense of the Nation”. They basically supported the 
January petition but in addition to that they rejected all forms of extremism and terrorism 
(Russell 2005: 74). Moreover, 300 Saudi women filed an eight point petition in December 
2003 demanding more rights (Raphaeli 2005: 526).  
The clear and persistent criticism of the lack of reform provoked the royal house 
against the reform proponents. When some of them brought another petition in 
December 2003 demanding accountability for the implementation of the previously 
announced reforms, Abdullah personally read them the riot act (Fürtig 2005a: 281). In 
2003 alone Abdullah received at least five petitions, another one came in 2004. In 
February 880 intellectuals demanded a precise schedule for political reforms and a 
constitutional reform. One of the initiators, professor Abdullah Hamed, even suggested a 
changeover from an absolute to a constitutional monarchy (Gresh 2006: 6).  
Henceforth the climate changed, the petitions exhausted the royal patience and the 
royal house came out with a heavy-handed response. The Ministry for Information issued 
a gag order to journalists who had ventured too far in their criticism of the religious 
establishment. Minister of Interior Nayef decreed that censorious reform advocates must 
be arrested (Kapiszewski 2006: 475) for statements “that do not serve the unity of the 
homeland or the integrity of the society” (Wilson 2004).  
Twelve reformists were detained in the middle of March because they had dared to 
remind the Princes in their last petition about a number of unmet demands for reforms. 
Nine of them were soon released on condition that they would stop filing such demands 
and cease their political activities. The three remaining petitioners, the poet Ali Dimeeni 
and professors Abdullah Hamed and Matrouk Faleh, refused to comply (Hamzawy 2006: 
8). They remained in custody and were sentenced to prison terms of six to nine years in 
May 2005 amidst protests by international human rights organizations (Coll 2005).17 Less 
than a week after his coronation Abdullah pardoned them in August 2005 (Mohler 2007: 
10).  
This example demonstrates the fault line that runs through the Saudi Royal Family. 
Minister of Interior Nayef wants to maintain the status quo, Crown Prince Abdullah 
favors dialog with all groups of society. But the reforms are not the only issue challenging 
the al-Sauds to find a common stance. In the coming years the Royal Family will have to 
identify a common denominator in many other areas, because the al-Sauds need to be 
able to make long-term decisions in order to solve the country’s social problems. 
3.3 Generational Change in the Royal Family 
The official order of succession to the Saudi Arabian throne is always the next eldest son 
of Ibn Saud. But now both King Abdullah and his Crown Prince Sultan are over 80 years 
old and the ruling family is having a heated debate about when to conduct a generational 
 
 
17 Six years for professor Matrouk Faleh, seven years for professor Abdullah Hamed and nine years for Ali 
Dimeeni (Gresh 2006: 7). 
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change in the royal house. This is why the focus of the debate in the royal court is now on 
the generation of grandsons. 
The transition from Fahd to Abdullah in 2005 went perfectly smoothly because 
Abdullah had assumed the affairs of the state ten years before Fahd’s death. Immediately 
upon accession to the throne Abdullah boosted the stability of the ruling house by 
appointing his half-brother Sultan as the Crown Prince. Apparently this prompt decision 
significantly curtailed intrigues and plots in the Royal Family. In contrast to his 
predecessors Abdullah had the opportunity to personally select his Crown Prince. In 1992 
King Fahd introduced a basic law that says that the throne will pass to direct descendants of 
Ibn Saud, in other words to his sons and grandsons. What caused a lot of excitement at the 
time was a rule allowing the King to appoint and dismiss his heir. However, Abdullah was 
explicitly exempt from this rule because he had been appointed as heir to the throne already 
in 1982 (Steinberg 2004a: 96f). Consequently he was the first king who could use this rule in 
his selection of the crown prince. His adherence to the familiar system of succession by his 
next younger (half-)brother indicates that Abdullah did not want or could not take 
responsibility for the generational change. 
Since that opportunity is gone, the challenge now is to find other ways to implement 
the necessary measures. If the family fails to decide on the transition between generations 
in the dynasty, in the worst case scenario it will have to select a new king from within its 
ranks every two or three years, with all the consequences this could entail for political 
continuity and stability in the country (Steinberg 2001: 25). 
3.4 Poverty, Unemployment and Education Deficiencies 
One of the biggest challenges for Saudi Arabia is to find a solution to its demographic 
problems. At 3.5% per annum the Saudi population has one of the highest growth rates in 
the world.18 Back in 1980 Saudi Arabia was home to only 7 million people, now 23 million 
live there. A logical consequence is the declining per capita income. By the late 1990s it 
sank from its 1981 peak of 28,600 USD per year to 8,000 USD. Rapid population growth, 
relatively low oil prices, economic mismanagement and corruption reduced it almost to 
third world levels.19 
Planning experts estimate that sustaining and improving the existing standards of living 
and welfare for the growing population will require the investment of approximately 270 
billion USD over the next twenty years (Länder und Märkte 2003c). Roughly 117 billion 
USD out of this amount will have to go into construction of new power plants. Another 90 
billion USD will be needed to build sea water desalination and waste treatment facilities. 
Production and utilization of national gas reserves will require about 27 billion USD. The 
rest should be invested in such areas as telecommunications, road and airport construction 
and new transportation systems (Länder und Märkte 2003c). 
 
 
18 Every woman in Saudi Arabia has an average of seven children (Fürtig 2006: 2).  
19 Now it has reached 14,000 USD again (Chimelli 2006: 3). 
Autocratic Modernization in Saudi Arabia 17
 
 
Another side effect of the high population growth is that the share of younger people 
in the society continuously increases. 45% of the population is less than 14 years old, 73% 
of people are under 29. Creating new jobs is therefore one of the highest political 
priorities in Saudi Arabia. Every year the Saudi Arabian labor market has to absorb 
130,000 young men. In reality, only 30,000 to 40,000 graduates find jobs. Since the public 
sector is already overstaffed and the oil industry does not show any employment-intensive 
growth, the unemployment rate20 among young males is estimated to be between 15% and 
30% (Länder und Märkte 2003a). Neither reliable statistics nor estimates are available for 
the female workforce whose employment opportunities are severely limited (i.e. teachers 
in girls’ schools, medical professionals for female patients). Approximately four to six 
million new jobs will have to be created for the young population by 2020 (Länder und 
Märkte 2003a). Given the difficult situation in the Saudi economy, this is hardly feasible. 
One of the attempts to create more jobs for Saudi citizens is “Saudization”. This 
“Saudization” envisioned 817,000 new jobs for Saudis between 2000 and 2005. In parallel 
to new employment opportunities there is a plan to reduce the share of foreign nationals. 
The Ministry of Labor published a report in May 2001, demanding that the number of 
foreign workers be cut back from seven million to one million by 2030 (Steinberg 2004a: 
100). But the government neglects the relatively low level of professional training in Saudi 
Arabia. Foreign labor force is better qualified and significantly less costly. It is observed 
that Saudi Arabian professionals earn twice as much in wages as foreign colleagues with 
equivalent qualifications (Länder und Märkte 2004). Moreover, traditionalist portions of 
the population refuse to work in the modern industries or service sector. 
Despite all the calls for “Saudization” the Saudi Arabian secondary and higher education 
system cannot educate and train a qualified labor force for the Saudi labor market (Länder 
und Märkte 2003a).21 The fundamental problem is that education is split into two parallel 
sectors: one is dominated by religion and fully controlled by Wahhabi scholars, the other 
bears a stronger resemblance to secular education systems. But the religious content still 
accounts for almost a third of the curriculum in the latter sector and reflects the views of 
Wahhabi scholars. This problem also pertains to other subjects on the curriculum. The 
government’s proposal to introduce English – the only foreign language officially permitted 
to be taught in Saudi Arabia – in the elementary level for six-year olds met with bitter 
resistance from religious forces. They are afraid of the growing Westernization of education 
and a reduction in the seven hours per week of religious education. Knowledge from the 
West may be transmitted only very selectively, it is restricted to natural sciences and 
 
 
20 Consequences of unemployment in Saudi Arabia are not comparable to those in the West. So far in the 
Kingdom families have been responsible for the subsistence of the unemployed. However, the number of 
poor families without the means to support their unemployed members has grown in the recent years 
(Steinberg 2004b: 125f).  
21 In its Human Development Report UNDP estimated that the adult (older than 15 years) illiteracy rate was 
still around 22% in 2002 (Hahn 2005: 17). 
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technical or applied sciences. The study of history, sociology, philosophy, and many other 
subjects is either impossible, or severely restricted (Länder und Märkte 2003b).22 
Meanwhile Abdullah has recognized these problems. Since his accession to the throne 
society has become more transparent, there are unprecedentedly open discussions of such 
topics as population growth, education, poverty, and unemployment (Gresh 2006: 6f).  
This chapter has demonstrated that urgent reforms were needed to respond to the 
challenges. The next chapter is intended to explain what reforms the royal house initiated 
to address the political, economic and social challenges described above, without jeopard-
izing the stability of its rule. 
4. Transformation and Reforms 
4.1 The Return to the Diplomatic Arena 
The biggest foreign policy challenge for the Kingdom was to mend its relations with the 
United States after September 11, without losing face in the eyes of its Muslim population 
and neighbors. 
Despite initial efforts to downplay the participation of Saudi citizens in September 11 the 
Saudi leadership quickly realized that it could not ignore the criticism from the US. As one 
of the first steps in the week after 9/11 Saudi Arabia sent the US a conciliatory gift: nine 
million barrels of crude oil, a day’s output, were shipped to the US for free (Henderson 
2002). 
In addition, the Royal Family launched an outreach campaign in the American mass 
media to project a positive image of Saudi Arabia. It hired two PR firms to restore the 
image of Saudi Arabia as a US ally and yet another company to raise Congress members’ 
awareness of the Saudi Kingdom and its interests (Marquis 2002).  
But all these superficial attempts at improving the relationship could not disguise the 
fact that the allies had to deal with major political differences. One of the first signs came 
when Saudi investors pulled at least 100 billion USD worth of funds out of American 
holdings (Sieff 2004: 97). Disagreements around the war on terror also became more 
pronounced. 
 
 
22 The Saudi Arabian higher education system remains very dependent on Western knowledge. One of the 
core weaknesses of the Saudi university system lies in the qualifications of the teaching staff. The total 
number of instructors with doctorate degrees is still only 10,738. Foreigners make up roughly 50% of the 
8,291 male educators with postgraduate degrees. Their share of 1,487 in the 2,447-strong female faculty 
with advanced degrees is even higher (Hahn 2005: 41).  
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But despite the 15 Saudi hijackers – or maybe precisely because of them – Saudi Arabia 
joined the coalition against terror.23 Nevertheless it rejected the antiterrorism coalition’s 
campaign in Afghanistan. It made it clear even before the start of the hostilities on 
October 7, 2001 that it would not provide any logistical support because it could not 
accept a war by a Western power against a Muslim state.24 The US combat aircraft 
stationed at the Prince Sultan airbase near Riyadh to enforce the southern no-fly zone in 
Iraq were not allowed to take part in the assault on Afghanistan. Saudi Arabia acquiesced 
only to the operation of the recently completed state-of-the-art command and control 
center at the base. At the same time Minister of Interior Nayef repeatedly and publicly 
criticized American actions in Afghanistan (Steinberg 2003: 26).  
The Kingdom also criticized the American policy towards the Baathist regime in 
Baghdad. At a conference in February 2002 Prince Nayef unambiguously explained the 
Saudi position on a potential strike against Iraq. “Saudi Arabia is against resolving 
disputes through violence. [...] If this happens, God forbid, the Kingdom will not in any 
circumstance be for any war against any Arab country” (Peterson 2002: 72).  
All denials notwithstanding, Riyadh provided the US with inconspicuous but effective 
military support (Cordesman 2006: 31). In the weeks preceding the hostilities the number 
of US soldiers on Saudi Arabian soil grew to almost 10,000 (Schmitt 2003: 1). The Prince 
Sultan airbase was allowed to operate as a command and control center throughout the 
air campaign. At the same time American elite troops were moved to the Arar and Tabuk 
airbases in the North-East of the country before being sent to carry out special forces 
operations inside Iraq (Gresh 2003: 1). 
For the time being, support for the war in Iraq was to be the last American operation 
at the Prince Sultan airbase. The US planned to withdraw all its troops from Saudi Arabia 
in early 2003 and station them at the Al-Ubeid airbase in neighboring Qatar. The 
withdrawal was completed on September 22, 2003. Approximately 300 U.S. Army and Air 
Force personnel stayed behind for joint military exercises until May 2006 (Prados/  
Blanchard 2006: 10). The withdrawal was a relief for both parties in terms of domestic 
politics. Former Assistant Secretary of State Richard N. Murphy welcomed the with-
drawal: “Our presence has become more of a burden than a benefit” (Tyler 2003: 14). The 
Saudi leadership supported the withdrawal even though US military presence on Saudi 
soil had been a factor of stability for the ruling family and an insurance policy against 
insurrectionists. The presence of US troops resulted in criticism from the opposition and 
became so unpopular domestically that the stability of the al-Saud regime was better 
served by the withdrawal than by a continued presence. Rumor has it that Abdullah had 
made the deal already in January 2003 for the troops to pull out after the invasion of Iraq 
 
 
23 Foreign Minister Saud: “We felt nothing but condemnation for those who committed this utterly criminal 
act.[...] The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has confirmed its categorical rejection of all kinds of terrorism, and 
sincere determination to combat it lonely and in cooperation with the world community” (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Saudi Arabia 2002).  
24 Defense Minister Sultan addressed this by saying: “We do not accept the presence in our country of a 
single soldier at war with Muslims or Arabs” (Teitelbaum 2001). 
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and offered regional elections in return (Tyler 2003: 14). Despite the withdrawal the US 
remains Saudi Arabia’s most important military advisor, supplier and source of technical 
know-how. Between 2001 and 2004 Saudi Arabia procured 5.6 billion USD worth of 
weapons. The USA received 68 % of these contracts (3.8 billion USD) (Cordesman 2006: 
32).  
However, the biggest foreign policy challenge for Riyadh is the current situation in the 
region. The collapse of neighboring Iraq has created a new set of problems. Riyadh is 
worried about the realignment of powers and the rise of radical Shi’a leaders like Muktada 
al-Sadr in Iraq.25 The Saudis fear a sectarian war in neighboring Iraq but they are already 
entangled in it for reasons of religion. When Vice President Dick Cheney was visiting 
Riyadh in December 2006, King Abdullah indicated that the Saudis would support the 
Iraqi Sunnis if the US withdrew and a civil war broke out (Chimelli 2007a: 8).  
King Abdullah is exploiting all his diplomatic talents to secure stability in Iraq and the 
whole region. Saudi Arabia mediates almost all conflicts in the region. Abdullah received 
a lot of praise from diplomats for the Mecca Agreement between Hamas and Fatah in 
February 2007.26 In March 2007 the Kingdom hosted the Arab League Summit. Saudi 
Arabia has been negotiating on all fronts: Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, and Palestine. 
It looks like Riyadh is trying to use its mediator role to make itself indispensable not 
only for its neighbors but also for Washington. What is unmistakable is that the Saudis 
are not neutral brokers, they have clear interests. The primary reason for their diplomatic 
efforts is the growing Iranian power. Much to the displeasure of Saudi Arabia, Iran has 
gained significant influence in the region over the last four years: because of the collapse 
of the Saddam dictatorship, the growing role of the Hisbollah Shi’a militia in Lebanon and 
the Shi’a support for Hamas in Palestine. On top of this, Teheran is developing a nuclear 
program (Avenarius 2007: 4). Saudi Arabian responses are clear. It increases its oil 
production to prevent Iran from dictating the oil price and strengthening its power. 
Moreover, King Abdullah forged a Sunni alliance with Egypt and Jordan to contain the 
Shi’a dominance (Khoudry 2007: 7). Despite the rivalry the Iranian President Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad made his first state visit to Riyadh on March 4, 2007.27 Allegedly on the 
agenda were the Iranian nuclear program and the future of Iraq. The meeting between 
Ahmadinejad and Prince Bandar, the former ambassador to Washingtion and a close ally 
 
 
25 This is why the former Saudi Ambassador to Washington Prince Turki said: “Our main interest is in 
stabilizing the situation in Iraq and maintaining the territorial integrity of Iraq. And it would be counter 
to our interest to have a continually disturbed Iraq, whether it is through sectarian or ethnic violence” 
(Scharff 2006). 
26 After many failed attempts at mediation by regional stakeholders the King brokered a deal between Fatah 
and Hamas. It requires the Palestinians to pursue dialog and partnership instead of violence to deal with 
internal Palestinian disagreements.  
27 “Rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia”, in Süddeutsche Zeitung, 5.3.2007, 8. 
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of the US President, may indicate that Saudi Arabia has been acting as mediator between 
the USA and Iran.28  
Riyadh benefits from the US policy to support all pro-Western governments in the 
Middle East irrespective of how democratic or undemocratic their regimes are. Saudi 
Arabia has skillfully used this advantage to strengthen its position in the region. The state 
visit by US Secretary of State Rice in August 2007 showed that the USA was promoting an 
Arab-Israeli front against Iran (Chimelli 2007b: 4). Since then Washington has stopped 
criticizing Saudi Arabia for its autocratic form of government and started praising it as a 
moderate Islamic state. In order to contain Iran, Saudi Arabia receives new weapons 
worth roughly 20 billion USD. In return, it sent an ambassador to Baghdad and intends to 
respond to Washington’s wishes and join the efforts to revive the Middle East peace 
process (Oetliker 2007).  
The royal house’s foreign policy after 9/11 should be seen in the context of Saudi 
relations with Washington. The Saudi royals tried to satisfy the Western partner by 
providing logistical support (which went almost unnoticed by the Saudi mass media) for 
the war in Iraq in 2003 and making an active contribution to containing Iran. The with-
drawal of troops and diplomatic activity in the region reflect the interests of both the 
Saudi and American people. Offensive operations against terrorists and active partici-
pation in regional negotiations have made the Saudis welcome guests again in Washing-
ton and saved the regime from continued destabilizing criticism. Moreover, the US post-
9/11 criticism of Riyadh is over, Saudi support in conflicts across the region is in demand. 
Thus the regime’s explosive foreign policy situation has cooled down noticeably and can 
no longer threaten its stability. Having been tarnished by the terror attacks of September 
11, 2001, the Saudis have taken this opportunity and successfully returned to the 
diplomatic arena.  
4.2 Participation – The New Word in Town 
Since 2003 Saudi Arabia has shown more decisiveness in combating terrorism on its own 
soil. Security forces have exposed terrorist cells and weapons depots in various parts of 
the country. Along with the wave of arrests hundreds of preachers were dismissed, 
ostensibly for insufficient professional qualifications (Glosemeyer 2003: 1). As Minister of 
Interior Prince Nayef claimed, the security forces had thwarted 90% of planned attacks 
(Frefel 2006b: 5). In the middle of 2004 the Saudi security forces greatly reduced the 
probability of attacks when they killed Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin, the “leader of al-Qaeda on 
the Arabian Peninsula” at the time (Lacroix 2005b).  
Along with the counterterrorism efforts the regime initiated some of the reforms that 
the people had demanded in the 2003 petitions. One of the first steps towards reforms was 
the decision to establish the “National Dialogue” as a permanent institution. The first 
 
 
28 “A Looming Rift: Riyadh and Teheran Are Seeking Peace between Sunnis and Shi’ites”, in Frankfurter 
Rundschau, 5.3.2007. 
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National Dialogue meeting took place in Riyadh on July 15-18, 2003. Behind closed doors 
pro-government spiritual leaders, liberal-Islamist reform advocates, Shi’ites and liberal 
intellectuals discussed various reform proposals (Fürtig 2005a: 276). The King Abdulaziz 
Center for National Dialogue was opened on August 3, 2003 to host the organization. 
A total of six National Dialogue meetings have taken place since then. They debated 
such issues as extremism, rights and responsibilities of women, education, youth and 
perceptions of foreigners (King Abdulaziz Center for National Dialogue 2007). Among 
other things the National Dialogue recommended elections to the Consultative Council, 
legitimization of trade unions and other civil society organizations, separation of powers 
into legislative, executive and judiciary, revision of curricula, modernization of religious 
discourse, better opportunities for responsible expression of opinions, more rights for 
women and mandatory schooling for girls (Fürtig 2005a: 276).  
Having introduced the National Dialogue, the King institutionalized a forum for 
peaceful dialogue to engage as many social groups in the reform process as possible. The 
Forum for National Dialogue is also a strategic measure to channel social pressure and 
retain control over the content and pace of reforms at the same time. Because as the 
arrests of the reform proponents have demonstrated, the ruling family was less inclined to 
dialog whenever demands went beyond its ideas.  
The National Dialogue meeting at the end of 2003 culminated in the royal house 
conceding to one of the reform demands and announcing elections to the municipal 
councils. An official proclamation on October 13, 2003 of elections to half of the muni-
cipal councils in the course of the next year set the process in motion (Glosemeyer/ 
Perthes 2003: 7). However, nine months had gone by before the Minister of Municipal 
and Rural Affairs announced that the elections would take place in September, applicable 
regulations came out soon afterwards. An absence of any information about voter and 
candidate eligibility, electoral districts and women’s right to vote had long cast doubts 
about the sincerity of the plans, a growing number of observers concluded that the 
announcement was merely a gesture to the US Administration (International Crisis 
Group 2004: 19). Skepticism grew when the elections were rescheduled from September 
2004 to early 2005. In December 2004 it was disclosed that women would be denied the 
right to vote purportedly because there was not enough time for preparations, but male 
citizens 21 years of age and over could vote. The election of half of the members in the 
Kingdom’s 178 municipal councils started on February 10, 2005 in Riyadh and proceeded 
in two (Eastern Province, March 3, and Hijaz from April 21) subsequent phases (Fürtig 
2005a: 285). Seats in municipal councils were heavily contested, for example, in Riyadh 
640 candidates ran for 7 seats (Wilson 2005a). 87,000 people registered as voters in the 
capital, another 149,000 – in the surrounding communities. This may not look like a lot, 
given that there are some four to five million residents there, but half the population – the 
women – was not eligible. And almost 30% of the population could not participate 
because they are foreigners (Chimelli 2005: 1). But even on balance, the turnout was low, 
only 25 to 35% of eligible voters went to cast their ballots (Hamzawy 2006: 12).  
The elections themselves had some odd features. There was no campaigning in the 
Western sense of the word. Advertising on the radio, television or in mosques was 
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forbidden. Newspaper advertisements were permitted, but no candidate was allowed to 
reveal his affiliation with any group (Chimelli 2005: 1). Only eight months after the vote 
did the government make public the procedures for these municipal parliaments and 
their authorities and rights. Two weeks later came the appointments to the second half of 
the seats, primarily notabilities selected because of certain qualifications (Gresh 2006: 6). 
Islamist opposition representatives came out as incontestable winners.29 For example, 
they won all seven seats in Riyadh (Kapiszewski 2006: 469). The losers justifiably accused 
them of having formed an Islamist alliance and of having used the religious establishment 
for propaganda and forbidden campaigning in mosques (MacFarquhar 2005). The two 
subsequent election phases produced identical results. Less surprising was that the 
Islamists clinched all the seats in Mecca and Medina. But even in Jeddah, the most liberal 
Saudi city all seven seats went to the candidates on the so-called “Golden List” of 
nominees favored by conservative religious leaders (Kapiszewski 2006: 469f). However, in 
other regions the elections finally delivered the long-awaited political participation for 
minorities. Thus for the first time in the history of Saudi Arabia a small fraction of the 
political power was given to the Shi’ites in the East of the country (Wilson 2005b).  
Even though President Bush praised Saudi Arabia,30 one should not forget that the 
elections did not constitute a breakthrough for democracy. The elected representatives 
have only regional influence and can be kept in check by the royal appointees if necessary 
(Nonneman 2006: 29). Nevertheless, large sections of the clergy and parts of the royal 
house opposed the elections on principle31 because they considered elections in general to 
be un-Islamic (International Crisis Group 2004: 23). Neither the Qur'an nor Sunna 
provide for such forms of expression of will. The National Dialogue as well is seen as a 
superfluous undertaking because truth may be attained only through religious discourse. 
If the perfect instrument is available, why regress to an imperfect one (International Crisis 
Group 2004: 23)? This is why many of the religious conservatives welcomed Minister of 
Interior Nayef32 who openly expressed his disapproval, saying “We can hold elections and 
rig them like other Arab nations” (Al-Ahmed/Shirreff 2004: 53-57) in a provocative 
statement in December 2003, two months after his half-brother Abdullah had announced 
the elections. The conservative and feared Nayef holds contrary views not only on the 
subject of reforms, Abdullah is confronted with opposition in the ranks of the al-Sauds on 
the issue of the generational change too. 
 
 
29 Unfortunately the published election results do not show which electoral districts were captured by liberal 
Islamists, conservative Islamists or Salafi Jihadists. 
30 “[T]he United States applauds the recently held elections in the Kingdom [of Saudi Arabia] [...] and looks for 
even wider participation in accordance with the Kingdom’s reform program” (Prados/Blanchard 2006: 21). 
31 The clergy’s position is ambivalent. It criticizes elections but supports certain candidates when elections 
take place. A case in point is the “Golden List”: instead of boycotting the elections, the clerics actively 
interfered to secure victory for the preferred candidates. 
32 Prince Nayef even issued a ban on the word reform (Islah) in public debate, he prefers the notion of 
“development” (at-tanmiya) (Abou-Taam/Khalatbari 2006: 125). 
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Abdullah has a rather weak position in the family. He has no full brothers33 and thus, 
in contrast to the Sudairi Seven, he does not enjoy automatic support from powerful 
elements in the family.34 On the other hand, he is supported by influential sons of the 
former King Faisal, who allegedly have a tense relationship with the Sudairis. Faisal’s sons 
are seen as religiously conservative and reform oriented at the same time,35 and they profit 
from the continued high esteem in which their father is held. 
The relationship between the King and his half-brother is full of mutual criticism, 
Nayef reproaches Abdullah for his overly liberal policies while the Minister of Interior 
aligns himself with the clergy. The two half-brothers and their respective camps argue, as 
to whether the power of the clergy should be restricted (Doran 2004).  
Probably because of his fragile position in the family Abdullah chose not to resolve the 
issue of the generational change himself by appointing his Crown Prince. Almost 
unnoticed by the general public, he published a decree in October 2006 passing a law on 
establishment of the Allegiance Commission. Henceforth the Commission will deal with 
issues of hereditary succession in the Saud dynasty and secure the continuity of its rule in 
the foreseeable future (Flottau 2007: 20f). 
Both the younger princes from the sons’ circle and princes in the grandson generation 
are viewed as potential heirs. Muhammad (*1950), the son of King Fahd, Khalid bin 
Sultan (*1949), the governor of the Asir Province on the Red Sea and Foreign Minister 
Saud bin Faisal (*1940) are treated as very promising candidates too. Succession by one of 
the younger sons, for example Salman (*1938), the governor of Riyadh, is also possible. 
Prospects for the two former ambassadors to Washington, Bandar bin Sultan (*1949) and 
Turki bin Faisal (*1945) are not as bright.36 Obviously, the young princes will have a hard 
time establishing themselves in the ruling house, because it is scarcely imaginable that the 
elder princes, including Minister of Interior Nayef, would be ready to abandon their own 
aspirations. 
 
 
33 Abdullah is the eldest of the three children and the only son of the state founder Ibn Saud and his eighth 
wife, Fahda Bint Asi al-Shuraym (Flottau 2007: 21).  
34 Abdullah’s strength has two pillars. Firstly, he is very popular in Najd where he enjoys good relations with 
the tribes and a reputation for piety. Secondly, he controls a strong power base in his capacity as the 
National Guard commander since 1963, with somewhere between 35,000 to 45,000 people under arms, it 
is almost as large as the army and consists primarily of descendants from Bedouin tribes (Steinberg 2003: 
11). 
35 The Foreign Minister Saud Al-Faisal holds the view that Saudi Arabia “has reached a stage in [its] 
development that requires expanding political participation.” Turki al-Faisal also emphasizes that 
“reforming the Kingdom is not a choice, it is a necessity” (Jones 2003). 
36 Being a son of a Sudanese slave, Bandar would not be an acceptable heir to the throne, even if he had 
strengthened his position by marrying one of the daughters of the former King Faisal (Steinberg 2003: 13). 
Arguments against Turki include his possible contacts with Osama bin Laden, his sudden retirement from 
the office of the Director of Foreign Intelligence after September 11, 2001 and his equally sudden and 
unexplained departure from Washington. 
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As a result of the reform the domestic politics of Saudi Arabia have experienced a 
visible transformation. The declining number of attacks since 2005 proves that the tough 
stance against terrorism was successful. 
The reforms propelled by Abdullah offer only a minimal response to the petitioners’ 
demands. It is true that the National Dialogue debates only topics approved by the royal 
house, but the participation of Shi’ites and women in this discussion forum has created a 
new venue for discriminated groups to express their views. Although the elections may 
have had some strange features, they should still be valued as the first step towards 
liberalization; it may look small from the outside, but it has an enormous magnitude from 
the Saudi perspective. The ruling house has successfully used the elections and the 
discussion forum of the National Dialogue to demonstrate change to the public without 
surrendering even a single privilege of power. Thus the reforms serve to stabilize the 
regime in the context of domestic politics and distract the citizens from obvious 
participatory deficits by offering minimal liberalization. 
The fact that the reform process came to a halt in 2005 could be seen as a sign of the 
reforms having been intended to stabilize the autocratic regime. Expanded political parti-
cipation in the Consultative Council has not been forthcoming. The official explanation is 
the current foreign policy focus of the Saudi ruler. Abdullah had to interrupt the reform 
process so that he could stand up to Iran (Khoudry 2007: 7). A more realistic explanation 
would be that further reforms could jeopardize the stability of the autocratic regime be-
cause increased participation by the people could possibly force the monarch to surrender 
effective elements of political power. 
4.3 Economic Problems Recognized, Danger Averted? 
Since 2003 the Saudi Arabian economy has been experiencing strong and sustained 
growth buoyed by oil prices. The rate was a substantial 5.3% in 2004, and it increased to 
6.6% in 2005. This development is reflected in the national budget. While 2002 saw a 
budget deficit of 5.3 billion USD, the country has been running a budget surplus since 
2003. The surplus amounted to 26.2 billion USD in 2004 and it grew to 57.1 billion in 
2005. Since 2003 a significant proportion of the the surplus has been used to pay off the 
foreign debt (Länder und Märkte 2007). Abdullah is very much committed to reducing 
Saudi Arabia’s foreign debt. It was he who saw to 60% of the surplus being directed 
towards paying back the debt (Länder und Märkte 2004).  
The Saudi government will have to exert itself to develop the infrastructure and create 
new jobs at the pace the population is growing. Therefore the primary objective of re-
forms is to create jobs, stimulate the private sector, accelerate the necessary infrastructural 
investment and continue opening the country to the global market. 
Thanks to large revenues from the oil industry Saudi Arabia can afford to expand its 
infrastructure. The labor market policy presents a bigger problem. Once it was recognized 
in 2005 that the first attempt at “Saudization” had not been successful, a new labor law 
was adopted on April 23, 2006. The objective is to increasingly replace foreign workers 
with Saudis. Businesses are required to bring their share of indigenous workforce up to 
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75%. A strict visa policy complements the program. The number of employment visas for 
foreigners will be dramatically reduced by 100,000 per year. The program met strong 
objections from both foreign and domestic businessmen. It is evident that the compulsory 
“Saudization” and tougher visa policy cannot remove the deficits in the education system 
(Länder und Märkte 2007).  
But the new labor law has produced positive effects too. It strengthened the rights of 
foreign workers. Employers are required to have written contracts with them, pay for 
their relocation and provide them with vacation time. On the other hand, the law requires 
enterprises to conduct professional training in order to increase the share of indigenous 
labor. Moreover, women received the right to work in areas that “conform to their 
nature”. They may not be required to work at night, they are entitled to maternity leave 
and (in larger companies with more than 50 people) day care for children or even 
kindergartens (100 and more employees). Implementation of these rules has been 
problematic: the religious police obstructs employment of women, occupational gender 
segregation has to be enforced, mobility remains an issue because women are not allowed 
to drive. Consequently women make up only 10.7% of the Saudi Arabian workforce, or 
approximately 4% of all people employed, even though there are more female than male 
university graduates. In reality, just as before their employment is limited to education, 
social services, healthcare and mass media. 
Along with the labor law a comprehensive capital markets law was introduced. The 
state wants to partially transfer some of its economic power into private hands. Over the 
next ten years the government wants to divest state-owned enterprises and institutions 
with a total value of 800 billion USD (AMEInfo 2005). So far the privatization program 
has been slow. Key sectors such as the state oil company Aramco and the Saudi Arabian 
Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC), and the biggest bank in the country, the National 
Commercial Bank, remain predominantly state controlled (Länder und Märkte 2007).  
Even though Saudi Arabia passed 40 laws in 2005 to increase its openness to trade and 
foreign investment, the influx of direct investment remains moderate by international 
standards with the exception of petrochemistry, telecommunications and gas produc-
tion.37 As in the past Saudi Arabian investors depend on assistance from Western experts 
(Nüsse 2006a).  
The most important step on the way to economic reforms was certainly the accession 
to the World Trade Organization (WTO). Saudi Arabia became its 149th member on 
December 11, 2005. Twelve years had gone by since it applied in 1993. During this period 
of time the Saudi economy gradually adjusted itself to the rules of international trade, 
 
 
37 Deregulation in some areas is already very advanced, one case in point is competition in the vital 
telecommunications market. The Emirate-based Telecom Etisalat operates the second national cellphone 
network since 2006. Electrical power generation and water production are open to foreign businesses, new 
railroad routes will be leased to operators after competitive bidding. Foreign banks already operate in the 
Kingdom, the Deutsche Bank was the first Western financial institution to receive its license in late 2003, 
the IT industry will benefit from zero customs duties on computers, semiconductors and other IT 
products until the beginning of 2008 (Glosauer 2006). 
Autocratic Modernization in Saudi Arabia 27
 
 
thus the accession itself did not require any major changes. Customs tariffs were reduced, 
imports were simplified, investment regulations were improved, and copyright protection 
was strengthened. In the course of accession talks Saudi Arabia signed 38 bilateral trade 
agreements with its partners (the last and most important agreement was signed in 
September 2005 with the USA)38, along with customs union treaties with the Arab League 
and the Gulf Cooperation Council. In addition, it adopted 42 new commerce laws and 
created nine new regulatory authorities. To obtain approval for accession from all 148 
member states, Saudi Arabia conducted 314 bilateral negotiations and produced 7,000 
pages of documents in response to a total of 3,400 inquiries and requests for clarifications 
(Fürtig 2006: 5).  
The concessions were sweeping and they will significantly change the Saudi Arabian 
business environment. While the Kingdom’s market for trade in goods is relatively open 
except for a few restrictions and features low customs barriers, the services market in 
particular will be affected by the reforms. Under the terms of the accession agreement 
signed with the USA Riyadh committed itself to an average customs duty of 3.2% on 
industrial products. Tariffs will be reduced even more significantly on a number of other 
important groups of products. Within the service sector it will result in the opening of 
such areas as banking and insurance, media, telecommunications, energy, courier services 
and construction (Länder und Märkte 2005). On balance, Saudi Arabia negotiated well 
and secured the most important issues: dual gas pricing (the domestic price is lower than 
the export price) and religious bans on certain imports (alcohol, drugs, gambling 
machines and pork). Its right to “Saudization” was also fixed in writing (Länder und 
Märkte 2007).  
The first success of the WTO accession was growth in foreign investments in Saudi 
Arabia. Total investment in 2006 went up to 18.3 billion USD, in any case a 51% increase 
compared to 2005 (Sagia 2007). 
A short-term effect of the high oil prices since 2003 is that they helped overcome the 
financial and economic crisis. To afford the necessary investment in the future, Abdullah 
counts both on continuously growing profits from the oil business and intended long-
term effects of reforms. 80 billion USD will be spent on boosting the production 
capacities. Aramco’s daily oil production is scheduled to grow from the current 9 million 
barrels to 12.5 million.39 But neither the larger revenues from the expanded production 
capacities, nor the rising oil prices could solve the long-term structural problems of the 
Saudi economy. The labor market reforms and privatization measures are the first steps 
towards stabilization and liberalization of the Saudi economy, but in order to stabilize 
 
 
38 The USA tied their approval for accession to support in the war on terror and normalization of relations 
with Israel. Saudi Arabia was required to show its readiness to establish political relations with Israel and 
distance itself from the Arab League’s boycott of Israel. Given this background, the parties arrived at the 
bilateral negotiations in early 2005 with so much baggage that these lasted for five months. The Saudi 
announcement that it would strictly follow WTO rules with respect to Israel must have certainly 
contributed to the successful outcome of the talks (Fürtig 2006: 6).  
39 “An Eastern Mecca for Western Investors”, in: Handelszeitung, 14.2.2007. 
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their power the potentates have to find alternative sources of revenue because the oil 
profits alone will not suffice to meet the growing needs of the people in the long run. 
4.4 Fewer Taboos in a Taboo-Ridden Society 
It is difficult to assess how severe the social problems really are. There are neither detailed 
statistics nor a trade union movement, social sciences are in their infancy. But there is a 
trend towards growing transparency in Saudi society. A few years ago, and increasingly 
since Abdullah’s accession to the throne on August 1, 2005, daily newspapers started to 
write regularly about social topics such as unemployment, poverty, prostitution and 
drugs. Even AIDS is no longer a taboo: leaflets with explanations about immune defi-
ciencies were distributed from ambulances in Jiddah on the World AIDS Day on De-
cember 1, 2005 (Gresh 2006: 6). 
Even subjects such as domestic violence are debated. The Saudi Association for 
Human Rights reports that 30% of the 5000 cases of abuse it was aware of were associated 
with violence against spouses – this may now also be reported in the press (Gresh 2006: 
6). One has to recognize improvements in terms of media freedoms. One may report 
failures more openly and engage in broad discussions of reforms (Frefel 2006a).  
Accompanying discussions about effects of censorship and tolerance of other religions 
and cultures took place at the February 2006 book fair in Riyadh. In addition, Abdullah 
authorized a controversial cultural program on the occasion of the fair which also 
included debates about media censorship and the effects of WTO accession on the Saudi 
culture. Moreover, the monarch established the first Ministry of Culture in the history of 
the conservative religious country (Nüsse 2006b). The three contentious areas of Saudi 
society (human rights, rights of women and education) still deserve criticism by western 
standards, but even in these areas the first positive changes are visible. 
The Minister of Interior may dismiss accusations of human rights violations in Saudi 
Arabia as “unsubstantiated” (El-Gawhary 2003: 10), but human rights organizations 
regularly reveal cases of torture and severe corporal punishment. The first six months of 
2005 saw a new record of 88 executions (Lau 2007: 3). Human rights organizations fre-
quently report the use of torture and forced confessions by the police. Another criticism is 
the continued ban on practice of religions other than Islam and import of religious ob-
jects and publications. Reports also condemn the lack of equality for women and 
foreigners (Steinberg 2003: 48). However, the first but slow steps towards openness 
should still be recognized as positive signs. The UN Human Rights Commission 
rapporteur made his first visit to the Saudi capital in October 2002. Moreover, a dele-
gation from Human Rights Watch arrived in January 2003 for talks with different mi-
nisters. In February 2004 and October 2005 Human Rights Watch was even granted 
access to Saudi prisons (Kapiszewski 2006: 471). The first Saudi human rights organi-
zation was established in spring 2003 (Kechichian 2003: 111). Even though there still is no 
substantial progress, these visits should be seen as a positive gesture by the Saudi 
government. There has also been visible progress on women’s rights. 
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For the first time in history Saudi women received personal identity cards in Novem-
ber 2001, “to combat fraud and forgery” (Kechichian 2004: 48), as Minister of Interior 
Nayef said. But even this was subject to restrictions: female applicants were required to 
show a written letter of consent from their guardians and employers, if applicable, and 
because of severe resistance from conservative circles the government emphasized that 
the IDs would not be introduced universally. The first time women publicly participated 
in the Jiddah Economic Forum was in 2002; they were separated from their male col-
leagues by only a partition wall. Now they also play an advisory role in the Consultative 
Council in gender-specific discussions such as large dowries (Steinberg 2003: 50). Women 
even have two permanent seats in the Consultative Council since 2004, and Foreign 
Minister Saud announced that his ministry would employ women (Zuhur 2005: 34). 
Women have also been granted enhanced political rights. As for the elections, Prince 
Turki bin Faisal promised that “women will vote the next time” (Chimelli 2005: 1).  
By now women constitute a majority of students in the Kingdom, demonstrating 
better average performance than their male counterparts. Women also control up to 25% 
of private equity in Saudi Arabia, as they enjoy limited inheritance rights and may file for 
financial support in case of divorce (Steinberg 2003: 50). 
The clergy has been very suspicious of these limited steps towards emancipation. In 
mosques, conservative clerics distributed pamphlets against fundamental rights of women 
(El-Gawhary 2005: 4). 
Women achieved a major breakthrough after a tragic accident in a girls’ school in 
Mecca. 15 girls died in a fire at a school. Witnesses reported in the Saudi press that the re-
ligious police had prevented girls from leaving the blazing building because the panicking 
girls forgot to put on their abayas, i.e. black robes worn with equally black scarfs and veils. 
Emergency exits were locked and the religious police controlled all other exits. Moreover, 
there were 800 girls at a school designed for 250. There were neither smoke detectors nor 
emergency exits (Gresh 2002: 14f). 
The royal house responded a few hours later: As proposed by Crown Prince Abdullah, 
King Fahd transfered the General Presidency for Girls’ Education to the Ministry of 
Education and dismissed its head (SAIS Review 2002: 207). Thus he took the authority 
over girls’ education away from an institution dominated by the Council of Senior Islamic 
Scholars. 
In general, the government has also attempted to reform the educational system. The 
Ministry of Education took some measures between 2002 and 2005 to remove extremist 
ideas from the curriculum and strike a balance between religious and non-religious 
subjects. Statements against Shi’ites and non-Muslims were deleted in 2002 and replaced 
with passages promoting respect for foreign cultures and religions. Non-religious 
curricula for girls and boys were harmonized in 2003 and 2004. Moreover, the liberal 
Minister of Education Muhammad al-Rashid spoke out in 2004 in favor of introducing 
English in elementary schools. 
The Wahhabi clergy adamantly rejected all these measures. The common curriculum 
for both sexes and additional hours for non-religious subjects in particular galled them. 
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156 Wahhabi scholars effectively halted further reforms when they filed a petition against 
education reforms in early 2004. In 2005 the clergy succeeded in ousting the liberal 
Minister of Education on the basis of libelous charges and replaced him with an 
ultraconservative, Abdullah Salih-al Ubaid (Hamzawy 2006: 14). 
The ongoing battle between the traditionalists and modernizers puts the brakes on the 
process of social liberalization. The two blocks quarrel over such subjects as excessively 
cruel forms of punishment, women’s rights and education. Despite some positive develop-
ments, the strong influence of the Wahhabi clergy on the social structure obstructs the 
nascent liberalization of Saudi society. The diverging views of the traditionalists and mod-
ernizers on the Saudi society will continue to cause friction in the future. The fundamental 
feature of Saudi society is the dichotomy between technological modernity and conservative 
religious values – it eludes control by the ruling house and presents the biggest threat to 
stability. 
5. Conclusion 
In conclusion it would be worthwhile reflecting upon the significance and implications of 
the Saudi reform process for the ruling elite, citizenry and the West. 
From the point of view of the ruling house, the reforms were to be used primarily to 
stabilize the regime. The external pressure after September 11 and the 2003/2004 petitions 
required urgent responses from the Royal Family. The objective was to preserve the 
absolute al-Saud monarchy and prevent both a potential regime change from the outside 
and an internal coup d’etat. The rulers saw an opportunity in minimal concessions to the 
demands from both parties. In other words, the royal house did not want to “democratize 
Saudi Arabia from the top” (Lüders 2007: 9), as it was erroneously portrayed in the West. 
On the contrary, it allowed as little change as was required to meet the minimum 
demands both from within the country and from the outside. Consequently, King 
Abdullah is no democratic reformer, but an autocratic modernizer. He is not interested in 
structural reforms that could result in redistribution of power. His partial liberalization 
tactics have essentially served to stabilize the power of his family and preserve the regime. 
As the explosive nature of reform “triggers” illustrates, the regime was a lot weaker 
before than after the reforms. The analysis has shown that the slowly paced liberalization 
of politics, economy and society has so far produced no threat to the stability of the Royal 
Family’s power. In this sense King Abdullah has for now achieved his objective of 
stabilization. 
Regardless of this, the reforms brought tremendous changes for the people. Even 
though only small portions of the demands in the petitions were implemented, these 
minor political reforms culminating in the first-ever local elections in 2005 made a 
tangible impact on the Saudi population. For the first time since the founding of the state 
the male citizens at least were allowed to cast their ballots and elect someone to represent 
their interests. This is a major development for Saudi society, which has received virtually 
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no rights since 1932. The same applies to the National Dialogue Forum as the first insti-
tutionalized form of expression of opinion, to enhanced freedoms of media, improve-
ments in education and efforts to create new jobs. On this basis, the O’Donnel and 
Schmitter democratization model (1986) points to a liberalization of the Saudi regime. 
However, in contrast to the model’s assumptions, democratization will not rapidly follow 
liberalization. As far as the people are concerned, it does not reduce the significance of 
these steps. 
Western observers see the policies of the autocratic desert kingdom since 2001 as 
proof of its potential for transformation in small steps. These responses have demon-
strated that the country could be induced to a slow transformation if external and internal 
pressures for reform were more destabilizing than the reforms themselves. But politicians 
in the West should always keep in mind the following three scenarios for the future. 
Scenario 1: The power of the ruling family erodes and a power vacuum emerges. If a 
fraternal war, a rising radical group or invasion by a foreign power destroys the power of 
the Royal Family, Saudi Arabia could lose its stability. As the experience of Afghanistan 
and Iraq demonstrate, the collapse of an autocratic government may turn Saudi Arabia 
into a “failed state”. If the al-Sauds were ousted, large portions of the country could be-
come “ungoverned territories”. Another concern is that no opposition group is strong 
enough to take full control over the government. If the Royal Family lost its power, 
Islamic opposition groups would struggle for power, which could lead to a civil war. 
Scenario 2: The conservative parts of the Royal Family will prevail in the struggle for 
succession. Since both the King and his Crown Prince are octogenarian, the near future 
will show what parts of the family win the battle for the throne. If Minister of Interior 
Nayef or one of his allies acceded to the throne, he would pursue a tougher Wahhabi-
motivated policy. As the conservatives in the family adamantly criticize both the petitions 
and the resulting elections, along with the embryonic liberalization, one should not expect 
them to continue opening up the regime. The clergy would increase their influence over 
women’s rights and education and reverse the recently completed positive changes. 
Scenario 3: The modernizers in the Royal Family will prevail in the struggle for suc-
cession. King Abdullah exerts every effort to direct the generational change within the 
family in favor of the modernizers. Should he succeed, it would be safe to assume that the 
earlier achievements would be preserved and even extended. Voting rights for women, 
new opportunities for non-religious education, extended media freedoms, new visits from 
human rights organizations would be possible, if this King and his future heir could con-
tinue promoting modernization in Saudi Arabia. Only if the moderate parts of the Royal 
Family could prevail in the power struggle, would the West be able to proactively 
advocate elections to the Consultative Council. Only a progressive monarch would let the 
Consultative Council first expand its parliamentary function and possibly later acquire 
legislative authority. In contrast to Saudi Arabia, other, smaller monarchies in the Gulf 
region have already taken this step. Oman has regular elections to the Consultative 
Assembly, Kuwait has had a partially elected parliament with extensive law-making 
powers since 1963 and Bahrain granted its citizens limited participation in the legislative 
process in a two chamber system. None of these states may be a democracy, but it is 
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obvious that these small monarchies allow their citizens more participation than Saudi 
Arabia does. 
As these scenarios demonstrate, the West should support the moderate elements 
within the Royal Family without jeopardizing the country’s stability in the process. Along 
with verbal pressure for reforms, modernization and liberalization, contacts between the 
societies under the motto “changes through exchanges” should be used to offer incentives 
to open up the opaque structures. This is the only way to pursue liberalization without 
creating a new Iraq. In any case, until further notice democracy will have to stay off of the 
agenda. 
Autocratic Modernization in Saudi Arabia 33
 
 
6. Bibliography 
Abou-Taam, Marwan/Khalatbari, Babak 2006: Das saudische Königreich nach dem 
Wechsel, in: Konrad-Adenauer-Auslandsinformationen 5/2006, 106-128. 
Al-Ahmed, Ali/Shirreff, Jamie 2004: Saudi-Arabiens politische Zukunft, in: Internationale 
Politik 8/2004, 53-57. 
Alterman, Jon 2003: Not in my Backyard: Iraq’s Neighbors’ Interests, in: The Washington 
Quarterly, Summer, 26: 3, 149-160. 
AMEInfo 2005: Saudi Privatisation Get into Top Gear, 26.5.2005, in: www.ameinfo.com/ 
61050.html (5.10.2007). 
Amnesty International Deutschland 2004: Drohende Abschiebung, Drohende Folter, in: 
www2.amnesty.de/internet/deall.nsf/51a43250d61caccfc1256aa1003d7d38/dd7afaeefabc6
6f4c1256e5500681b70?OpenDocument (14.7.2007). 
Asseburg, Muriel 2005: Demokratieförderung in der arabischen Welt – hat der partner-
schaftliche Ansatz der Europäer versagt?, in: Orient, 46: 2, 272-290. 
Avenarius, Thomas 2007: Die gefährliche Makelei des Königs. Abdullah von Saudi-Arabien 
instrumentalisiert den religiösen Konflikt zum Machterhalt am Golf, in: Süddeutsche 
Zeitung, 19.3.2007, 4. 
Bandow, Doug 2002: Befriending Saudi Princes: A High Price for a Dubious Alliance, in: 
Policy Analysis 428, 20.3.2002. 
Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2006, in: www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/ 
fileadmin/pdf/BTI_2006_Ranking_detailliert.pdf (14.7.2007). 
Bin Laden, Osama 1996: Declaration of War against Americans Occupying the Land of 
the Two Holy Places, in: www.religioscope.com/info/doc/jihad/jihadfile.html (20.6.2003). 
Brandes, Jörg-Dieter 1999: ... mit Säbel und Koran. Der Aufstieg der Königsfamilie Saud 
und der Wahabiten, Stuttgart. 
Brumberg, Daniel 2005: Liberalization versus Democracy, in: Carothers, Thomas/Ottaway, 
Marina: Uncharted Journey, Promoting Democracy in the Middle East, 15-36. 
Bush, George W. 2003: President Delivers „State of the Union“, in: www.whitehouse.gov/ 
newsreleases/2003/01/20030128-19.html (17.10.2007). 
Carothers, Thomas 2007: How Democracies Emerge. The „Sequencing“ Fallacy, in: Journal 
of Democracy, 18: 1, 12-27. 
Chimelli, Rudolph 2005: Wahlkampf im Beduinenzelt, in: Süddeutsche Zeitung, 10.2.2005, 
1. 
Chimelli, Rudolph 2006: Die neue Milde im Wüstenklima, in: Süddeutsche Zeitung, 
22.5.2006, 3.  
Chimelli, Rudolph 2007a: Zwist im Palast von Riad. Saudische Prinzen uneins über 
Haltung zu Iran und Irak, in: Süddeutsche Zeitung, 9.1.2007, 8. 
Chimelli, Rudolph 2007b: Alte Freundschaft: Die USA und Saudi-Arabien sind aufeinander 
angewiesen, entfremden sich aber zunehmend, in: Süddeutsche Zeitung, 31.7.2007, 4.  
Clauss, Thomas 1998: Extremismus und Fundamentalismus im Nahen Osten. Über die 
Quellen und Konfliktherde in der Region, Berlin. 
34 Iris Wurm 
 
 
Coll, Steve 2005: Islamic Activists Sweep Saudi Council Elections, in: Washington Post, 
24.4.2005.  
Congressional Record 2002: Hollings, Ernest (D-SC): Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Senate, 
10.10.2002, 107. Kongress), in: Congressional Record, S10348. 
Cordesman, Anthony H. 1999: Economics, Energy and the Future Stability of Saudi Arabia, 
in: www.csis.org/index.php?option=com_csis_pubs&task=view&id=1320 (24.7.2007). 
Cordesman, Anthony H. 2002: Saudi Arabia Enters the 21st Century: Foreign Relations and 
External Security, in: www.csis.org/index.php?option=com_csis_pubs&task=view&id=14 
71 (24.7.2007). 
Cordesman, Anthony H. 2006: Saudi-Arabia: Friend or Foe in the War on Terror?, in: 
Middle East Policy 13: 1, 28-41. 
Doran, Scott 2004: The Saudi Paradox, in: Foreign Affairs, January/February, www.geo 
cities.com/emorseraf/the_saudi_paradox.htm (5.10.2007). 
Ehteshami, Anoushiravan 2003: Reform from Above: The Politics of Participation in the 
Oil Monarchies, in: International Affairs 79: 1, 53-75. 
El-Gawhary, Karim 2003: Erste Wahlen in Saudi-Arabien, in: die tageszeitung, 15.10.2003, 
10.  
El-Gawhary, Karim 2005: Ein vorsichtiger Reformer rückt auf den Thron, in: General-
Anzeiger, 2.8.2005, 4. 
Fandy, Mamoun 1999: Saudi Arabia and the Politics of Dissent, New York, NY. 
Flottau, Heiko 2006: Meckern in Medina, in: Süddeutsche Zeitung, 3.1.2006, 12.  
Flottau, Heiko 2007: Saudi-Arabien vor der Zerreißprobe, in: Blätter für deutsche und 
internationale Politik, 01/2007, 20-24.  
Follath, Erich 2004: Ein Heimspiel für den Terror, in: Der Spiegel 22, 24.5.2004, 120.  
Follath, Erich/Windfuhr, Volkhard/Zand, Bernhard 2002: Die Brutstätte des Terrors, in: 
Der Spiegel 10, 4.3.2002, 148. 
Francois, Monika/Sud, Inder 2006: Promoting Stability and Development in Fragile and 
Failed States, in: Development Policy Review, 24: 2, 141-160.  
Freedom House 2007: Saudi Arabia, in: www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22& 
country=7265&year=2007 (14.7.2007). 
Frefel, Astrid 2006a: König Abdallah steht für langsame Reformen, in: Tages-Anzeiger, 
19.1.2006, 8.  
Frefel, Astrid 2006b: Saudischer König sagt Armut und Terror den Kampf an, in: Tages-
Anzeiger, 3.4.2006, 5.  
Fürtig, Henner 2005a: Saudi-Arabien, in: Faath, Sigrid (Hrsg.): Demokratisierung durch 
externen Druck? Perspektiven politischen Wandels in Nordafrika/Nahost, Hamburg, 269-
317. 
Fürtig, Henner 2005b: Der Stern der Verbündeten ist verblasst, in: Das Parlament, 32-33, 
8.8.2005.  
Fürtig, Henner 2006: Saudi-Arabiens WTO-Beitritt. Bestätigung des wirtschaftlichen 
Reformkurses, in: Giga Focus 5/2006. 
Autocratic Modernization in Saudi Arabia 35
 
 
Gause, F. Gregory 2002: Be Careful What You Wish For: The Future of U.S.-Saudi 
Relations, in: World Policy Journal 19: 1, 37-50. 
Gause, F. Gregory 2004: Saudi Arabia Challenged, in: Current History 103: 669, 21-24. 
Glosauer, Christian 2006: WTO-Beitritt beschleunigt Marktöffnung in Saudi-Arabien, in: 
Bundesagentur für Außenwirtschaft, 4.1.2006.  
Glosemeyer, Iris 2003: Terroristenjagd in Saudi-Arabien, in: SWP-Aktuell 29/2003.  
Glosemeyer, Iris/Perthes, Volker 2003: Reformen gegen den Terror, in: SWP-Aktuell 
48/2003. 
Gold, Dore 2003: Hatred’s Kingdom: How Saudi Arabia Supports the New Global 
Terrorism, Washington, DC. 
Gresh, Alain 2002: Saudi-Arabien riskiert Öffentlichkeit, in: die tageszeitung, Le Monde 
diplomatique, 17.5.2002, 14-15. 
Gresh, Alain 2003: Prinzen und Falken gemeinsam gegen den Terror, in: die tageszeitung, 
Le Monde diplomatique, 13.6.2003, 1.  
Gresh, Alain 2006: Ein König der nicht mehr Majestät heißen will, in: Die tageszeitung, Le 
Monde diplomatique, 10.2.2006, 6-7. 
Gvosdev, Nikolas 2004: Wie man den Bock zum Gärtner macht – Grundlegende 
Schwächen der amerikanischen Reformpläne, in: Internationale Politik, 7/2004, 45-48.  
Hahn, Karola 2005: Länderanalyse Saudi-Arabien, Der saudische Markt für Hochschul-
bildung, in: www.uni-kl.de/wcms/fileadmin/isgs/pdf/Publikationen_Hahn/Saudi_Arabien_ 
Hahn_final.pdf (14.7.2007). 
Hamzawy, Amr 2006: The Saudi Labyrinth: Evaluating the Current Political Opening, in: 
Carnegie Papers, Nr. 68. 
Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia of the Committee on 
International Relations 2001: Recent Development in the Middle East, House of Repre-
sentatives, 17.10.2001, 107. Kongress, Serial No. 107-45. 
Henderson, Simon 2002a: The Bush Administration and OPEC: The National Energy Policy 
Revisited (Policy Watch Nr. 611), in: http://washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php? 
CID=1489 (23.7.2007). 
Hertog, Steffen 2002: Kooperation hinter den Kulissen. Die Doppelbödigkeit der amerika-
nisch-saudischen Allianz, in: Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik 10/2002, 
1217-1226. 
Huntington, Samuel 1968: Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven.  
International Crisis Group 2004: Can Saudi Arabia reform itself?, in: ICG Middle East 
Report Nr. 28, 5.  
Jones, Toby 2003: Social Contract for Saudi Arabia (Middle East Report, Nr. 228), in: 
www.merip.org/mer/mer228/mer228.html (14.7.2007).  
Kapiszewski, Andrzej 2006: Saudi Arabia: Steps Towards Democratization or Recon-
figuration of Authoritarianism?, in: Journal of Asian and African Studies 41: 5-6, 459-482. 
Kechichian, Joseph 2003: Testing the Saudi „Will to Power“: Challenges Confronting 
Prince Abdallah, in: Middle East Policy 10: 4, 100-115. 
36 Iris Wurm 
 
 
Kechichian Joseph 2004: Democratization in Gulf Monarchies: A New Challenge to the 
GCC, in: Middle East Policy 11: 4, 37-57. 
Khoudry, Yasmina 2007: An den Saudi-Arabern hängt das Gleichgewicht im Nahen 
Osten, in: Die Welt 34, 9.2.2007, 7.  
King Abdulaziz Center for National Dialog 2007: The Final Statement, in: www.kacnd.org/ 
eng/sixth_meeting.asp (14.7.2007). 
King, Craig K. 1998: Impact of a Regime Change in Saudi Arabia: An Operational 
Perspective, Alabama, AL. 
Kleveman, Lutz C. 2003: Biblischer Reichtum, in: www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/0,1518,234 
700,00.html (13.2.2003). 
Krockow, Christian von 1976: Reform als politisches Prinzip, München. 
Koszinowski, Thomas 2001: Unterdrückt: Islamische Opposition in Saudi-Arabien, in: 
Orient-Journal 02/2001, 17.  
Koszinowski, Thomas 2002: Exilopposition als politischer Akteur, Band IV. Die saudische 
Exilopposition, in: DOI-Focus Nr. 7, 3-13. 
Lacroix, Stephane 2004: Between Islamists and Liberals: Saudi Arabia’s New „Islamo-
Liberal“ Reformists, in: Middle East Journal, 58: 3, 345-365.  
Lacroix, Stephane 2005a: Post-Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia? in: www.ceri-sciencespo.com/ 
archive/mars05/artsl.pdf (5.10.2007).  
Lacroix, Stephane 2005b: Die islamischen Strömungen nach dem 11. September, Zur 
Neugestaltung der politischen Landschaft Saudi-Arabiens, in: inamo, 42, 10-11.  
Länder und Märkte 2003a: Saudi-Arabien. Wirtschaftsentwicklung 2002/03. Überblick, 
in: Länder und Märkte, 2.7.2003. 
Länder und Märkte 2003b: Weiterbildung in den arabischen Golfstaaten mit Nachholbe-
darf, in: Länder und Märkte, 16.4.2003. 
Länder und Märkte 2003c: Saudi-Arabien muss in seine Infrastruktur investieren, in: 
Länder und Märkte, 11.2.2003. 
Länder und Märkte 2004: Saudi-Arabien, Wirtschaftstrends zum Jahreswechsel 2004/05, 
Ausblick, in: Länder und Märkte, 7.12.2004.  
Länder und Märkte 2005: Saudi-Arabien öffnet sich dem Welthandel, in Länder und 
Märkte, 11.11.2005. 
Länder und Märkte 2007: Saudi-Arabien. Energiewirtschaft, in: Länder und Märkte, 
6.2.2007. 
Lau, Mariam 2007: Zweifelhafter Verbündeter, in: Die Welt, 3.8.2007, 3.  
Levitt, Matthew 2002: Tackling the Financing of Terrorism in Saudi Arabia (Policy Watch 
Nr. 609), in: http://washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=1487 (23.7.2007). 
Lüders, Michael 2007: König Abdullah modernisiert diskret, in: Frankfurter Rundschau, 
7.11.2007, 9. 
MacFarquhar, Neil 2003: Al Qaida Blamed in Deadly Attack on Saudi Homes, in: New 
York Times, 10.11.2003, 1. 
Autocratic Modernization in Saudi Arabia 37
 
 
MacFarquhar, Neil 2005: Some Saudi Candidates Claim Election Violations, in: New York 
Times, 14.2.2005, 6.  
Mansfield, Edward/Snyder, Jack 1995: Democratization and War, in: Foreign Affairs, 74: 
3, 79-97. 
Mansfield, Edward/Snyder, Jack 2005: Electing to Fight, Why Emerging Democracies go 
to War, Cambridge.  
Marquis, Christopher 2002: Worried Saudis Pay Millions To Improve Image in the U.S., 
New York Times, 29.8.2002, 1. 
Marshall, Monty G./Jaggers, Keith 2005: Polity IV Country Index Saudi Arabia, in: http:// 
members.aol.com/CSPmgm/SaudiArabia2005.pdf (14.7.2007). 
Meyer, Josh 2003: Saudi Government Provided Aid to 9/11 Hijackers, Sources Say, in: Los 
Angeles Times, 2.8.2003.  
Miller, John/Stone, Michael/Mitchell, Chris 2002: The Cell: Inside the 9/11 Plot, and Why 
the FBI and CIA Failed to Stop It, New York, NY. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Saudi Arabia 2002: Statement by Prince Saud-Al Faisal before 
the U.N. General Assembly, New York, 19.9.2002, in: www.un.org/webcast/ga/57/state 
ments/020919saudi_ArabiaE.htm (24.7.2007). 
Mohler, Nicola 2007: Unter Terrorverdacht, in: die Tageszeitung, 24.2.2007, 10.  
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States 2004: 9/11 Commission 
Report 2004, in: www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf (1.2.2007).  
National Energy Policy Development Group 2001: National Energy Policy, in: www.white 
house.gov/energy/National-Energy-Policy.pdf (14.7.2007). 
Nonneman, Gerd 2006: Political Reform in the Gulf Monarchies, in: www.lancs.ac.uk/fss/ 
politics/people/nonneman/Nonneman %20LUCE %20paper %20DMEP.pdf (14.7.2007). 
Nüsse, Andrea 2004: Saudi-Arabien. Das Urteil des Großmuftis über die Attentäter fällt 
vernichtend aus, in: Frankfurter Rundschau, 23.4.2004, 1. 
Nüsse, Andrea 2006a: Marktwirtschaftliches Denken hält Einzug in Riad, in: Stuttgarter 
Zeitung, 15.8.2006.  
Nüsse, Andrea 2006b: Der Reformkurs ist vielerorts nur Augenwischerei, in: Frankfurter 
Rundschau, 26.5.2006.  
O’Donnell, Guillermo/Philippe C. Schmitter 1986: Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: 
Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, Baltimore, London. 
Oetliker, Sybille 2007: Saudis unterstützen US-Friedenskonferenz, in: Frankfurter Rund-
schau, 2.8.2007. 
Perthes, Volker 2002a: Geheime Gärten. Die neue arabische Welt, Berlin. 
Perthes, Volker 2002b: Die Araber und Amerika, in: Arbeitspapier Forschungsgruppe 
Naher/Mittlerer Osten und Afrika – Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin.  
Perthes, Volker 2002c: Der Nahe und Mittlere Osten 1990/91 und 2001/2: Ein vergleichen-
der Lagebericht (Arbeitspapier Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik), Berlin. 
Peterson, J.E. 2002: Saudi Arabia and the Illusion of Security, in: Adelphi Papers 348, New 
York, NY. 
38 Iris Wurm 
 
 
Prados, Alfred B. 2003: Saudi Arabia: Current Issues and U.S. Relations (CRS Issue Brief for 
Congress, Updated August 4, 2003), in: www.saudi-us-relations.org/facts/2003_08_04_CRS. 
pdf (14.7.2007). 
Prados, Alfred/Blanchard, Christopher 2006: Saudi-Arabia: Current Issue and U.S. Relations 
(CRS Report for Congress, Updated August 2, 2006), in: http://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL 
33533.pdf (24.7.2007).  
Raphaeli, Nimrod 2005: Demands for Reform in Saudi-Arabia, in: Middle Eastern Studies 
41:4, 517-532. 
Rössel, Jörg 2000: Mobilisierung, Staat und Demokratie, in: Kölner Zeitschrift für 
Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, 53: 4, 609-635. 
Russell, James A. 2005: Saudi Arabia in the 21st Century: A New Security Dilemma, in: 
Middle East Policy 12: 3, 64-78. 
SAIS Review 2002: A Dialogue: Saudi Arabia, in: SAIS Review 22: 2, 199-228.  
Sagia 2007: Saudi Arabia attracts $ 18,3b foreign investment in 2006, in: www.investinsaudi. 
com/en/sagia-centre/media-lounge/news-en/saudi-arabia-attracts-183b-foreign-investment 
-in-2006.html (5.10.2007). 
Sandschneider, Eberhard 1995: Stabilität und Transformation politischer Systeme, Opladen. 
Satloff, Robert 1998: What about Saudi Arabia Should (or Shouldn’t) Concern You, in: 
Zelikow, Philip D./Zoellick, Robert B. (Hrsg.): America and the Muslim Middle East: 
Memos to a President, Washington, DC, 51-61.  
Scharff, Michael 2006: Saudi Envoy Defends Iraq Role in Speech at Princeton, in: University 
Wire, 8.12.2006. 
Schmidt, Susan 2002: Sept 11 Families Join to Sue Saudis: Banks, Charities and Royals 
Accused Of Funding to al Qaeda Terrorist Network, Washington Post, 16.8.2002. 
Schmitt, Eric 2003: Aftereffects: The Pullout, in: New York Times, 30.4.2003, 1.  
Seznec, Jean-Francois 2002: Stirrings in Saudi Arabia, in: Journal of Democracy 13: 4, 33-
40.  
Sharp, Jeremy 2004: Saudi Arabia: Reform and U.S. Policy (CRS Report for Congress 
Oktober 13, 2004), in: www.opencrs.com/rpts/RS21913_20041013.pdf (24.7.2007).  
Sieff, Martin 2004: Sand in Our Eyes: U.S. Saudi Relations after Iraq, in: The National 
Interest, Nr. 76, 98-100. 
Sirhal, Ahmed 1990: The Political and Constitutional Systems in Lebanon and the Rest of 
the Arab States, Beirut. 
State Failure Task Force 2000: State Failure Task Force Report: Phase III Findings, 
McLean, VA, Science Applications International Corporation. 
Steinberg, Guido 2001: Der nächste Machtwechsel im Nahen Osten. Thronfolge und 
Opposition in Saudi-Arabien, Konrad-Adenauer-Auslandsinformationen 06/2001, 22-45. 
Steinberg, Guido 2002: Religion und Staat in Saudi-Arabien, Die wahhabitischen Gelehr-
ten 1902-1953, Würzburg.  
Steinberg, Guido 2003: Die innenpolitische Lage Saudi-Arabiens nach dem 11. September 
2001, DOI-Focus, Nr. 8.  
Autocratic Modernization in Saudi Arabia 39
 
 
Steinberg, Guido 2004a: Saudi-Arabien. Interne und regionale Probleme, in: Wagner, 
Wolfgang (Hrsg.): Jahrbuch internationale Politik, München, 95-122. 
Steinberg, Guido 2004b: Saudi-Arabien: Politik, Geschichte, Religion, München.  
Stork, Joe 1980: Saudi Arabia and the U.S., in: MERIP Reports, 0: 91, Oct. 1980, S. 24-30. 
Taecker, Kevin 1998: Gulf Capital Markets and Family Business (Saudi American Bank 
economic seminar paper), Riad. 
Teitelbaum, Joshua 2001: September 11 and the Saudi Arabian Connection (Policy Watch 
Nr. 573), in: www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=1451 (24.7.2007). 
Teitelbaum, Joshua 2005: Terrorist Challenges to Saudi Arabian Internal Security, in: 
Middle East Review of International Affairs 9: 3. 
Thumann, Michael 2003: Das unsichtbare Böse, in: Die Zeit, 12.6.2003, 3. 
Twinam, Joseph Wright 1994: The United States and the Gulf: Half a Century and Beyond, 
The Emirates Occasional Papers Nr.11, Abu Dhabi.  
Tyler, Patrick 2003: Aftereffects: The Outlook, in: New York Times, 30.4.2003, 14.  
Waldrauch, Harald 1996: Was heißt demokratische Konsolidierung?, in: www.ihs.ac.at/ 
publications/pol/pw_36.pdf (9.10.2007). 
Wilson, Scott 2004: Saudi Trial Could Alter Pace of Reform, in: Washington Post, 
19.9.2004. 
Wilson, Scott 2005a: Saudis Get Civic Lessons in Advance of Local Vote, in: Washington 
Post, 8.2.2005. 
Wilson, Scott 2005b: Shiites See an Opening in Saudi-Arabia, in: Washington Post, 
28.2.2005. 
Zuhur, Sherifa 2005: Saudi Arabia: Islamic Threat, Political Reform and Global War on 
Terror, in: www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB598.pdf (14.11.2007). 
